[Ohio UZO News] Economist; WP; EDM; NYT link

[Deychak, Orest]

The Economist 
Ukraine's politics 
Up for grabs
Nov 2nd 2006 | KIEV 

The birth-pangs of democracy, or an unseemly power struggle?

WHEN Ukraine emerged from the dying Soviet Union there were some, especially
in Russia, who said its independence was provisional, and its destiny was to
be swallowed up by its neighbours. During the "orange revolution" of 2004,
which swept Viktor Yushchenko to Ukraine's presidency, the threat of
dismemberment was revived by supporters of Viktor Yanukovich, his
Russian-backed rival. That talk has receded, but all else in Ukrainian
politics continues to be provisional.
 	
Viktor loses the spoils	

Mr Yanukovich's status as a disgraced election-rigger was temporary. After
his party won most seats in parliament last March he again became prime
minister, the job he held before the revolution. Other old faces have
returned with him. Under new, possibly provisional, constitutional
arrangements, the job carries increased powers that overlap with the
president's. Oleksandr Chaly, deputy head of the presidential
administration, says that all democracies go through transitional periods in
which the powers of various arms of government are defined. But in Ukraine
the process looks less like constitutional fine-tuning than a revived power
struggle. 

So far, says a Western diplomat in Kiev, "the prime minister is winning".
The constitution makes the president responsible for foreign policy, but
that did not stop Mr Yanukovich saying, on a trip to Brussels, that
Ukraine's integration into NATO should be delayed. Despite Mr Yushchenko's
urgings, parliament is stalling over the legislation needed for Ukraine to
join the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Last week José Manuel Barroso,
president of the European Commission, admitted that neither the European
Union nor Ukraine was ready to talk about Ukrainian accession to the EU. 

Mr Chaly insists that there are "no strategic differences" between the two
Viktors. Yet the course of Western integration that Mr Yushchenko had set
may turn out to have been provisional. Mikhail Fradkov, Russia's prime
minister, was in Kiev just as a new deal was being reached on Ukraine's gas
imports. Ukraine faces a rise in the price of gas it buys from Russia and
Turkmenistan in 2007, though not as sharp as it feared. The prospect of a
renewed gas crisis, in which supplies to Ukraine could be cut off as they
were last January, seems to have been averted. 

But the deal is temporary and opaque, and rumours swirl over what
concessions the Russians have extracted in return. Mr Fradkov talked of the
two countries "synchronising" their WTO bids (the Russians fret that Ukraine
might get in before them). Mr Yanukovich mooted the possibility of Russia's
Black Sea fleet staying at Sebastopol, its Crimean base, after its lease
runs out in 2017. Mr Yushchenko's line, repeated again this week, was that
it would have to go. The bigger fear is that Kiev's control of Ukraine's
gas-pipeline network may be provisional too. 

So might be the uncomfortable cohabitation of the two Viktors. Our Ukraine,
the president's party, last month broke off coalition negotiations with Mr
Yanukovich's lot-talks that, somewhat incredibly, had been going on ever
since March. Several ministers whom Our Ukraine had provisionally nominated
to the cabinet have now tendered their resignations-even though murmurs
about restarting the talks are growing louder. Mr Yanukovich's coalition
still has a parliamentary majority, but its odd combination of Communists
and business tycoons may prove unstable. (Like so many revolutionary
alliances, the "orange" team, led by Mr Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, was
purely tactical and has now collapsed.) 

Some in MrYanukovich's team see Mr Yushchenko himself as a temporary
president. He has brought some tough businessmen into his administration.
But his popularity is now so low that his chances of winning the next
presidential poll, in 2009, look slim. A few crowd-pleasing arrests of
corrupt former officials would buoy up his ratings; but it seems that his
campaign promises of justice were themselves provisional. Whether the real
gains of the revolution-freer media, cleaner elections and competitive
politics-prove more lasting remains to be seen.

Washington Post
Letter to Editor
Ukraine Leaning More Toward Russia

Wednesday, November 1, 2006; A20

Regarding the Oct. 5 op-ed "Ukraine's Choice: Toward Europe" by Prime
Minister Viktor Yanukovych:

Russia's domination of Ukraine dates to 1654, when Ukraine's revolutionary
leaders were forced to sign a unity pact with the Russian czar. The
Pereyaslav Agreement ended any hopes for Ukrainian sovereignty, not unlike
the recent "unity pact" signed between the party of Ukrainian President
Viktor Yushchenko and the pro-Russian Party of Regions. Knowing Ukraine's
history, Mr. Yanukovych should not be surprised that his attempts to
suffocate the goals of the Orange Revolution are met with severe opposition.
His prescribed direction will only lead to stagnation and subservience to
Vladimir Putin's Russia.

Ukraine cannot have a healthy free-market economy without protection of that
freedom, a role that NATO plays throughout Europe. One needs only to look
toward Georgia to understand the consequences of attempting one without the
other while under Russia's shadow. Ukraine may long for World Trade
Organization membership, but Mr. Putin has clearly stated his intention for
a simultaneous invitation with Russia. Such is the future of Ukraine's
foreign policy decision making. Yes, Ukraine has chosen Europe, but it will
not arrive there under the leadership of a man whose campaign slogan was,
essentially, "Just Say No to NATO."

ANDREW EVANS

Eurasia Daily Monitor
Monday, November 6, 2006 -- Volume 3, Issue 205

POLITICAL BATTLE IN UKRAINE OVER THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY

The governing Party of Regions and its leftist allies have launched a
systematic offensive to wrest control of Ukraine's foreign policy from the
president and his appointees. This offensive is forcing President Viktor
Yushchenko to defend his positions more resolutely than has hitherto been
the case, beginning with the issue of the Russian Fleet's basing in
Ukraine's Crimea.

Following Russian President Vladimir Putin's call to prolong that Fleet's
1997 basing agreements beyond 2017, Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor
Yanukovych hinted that he is in favor while Yushchenko obliquely indicated
that he is opposed (see EDM, October 30, November 1). However, amid the
contest over the conduct of foreign policy, their respective positions have
quickly polarized.

Speaking on November 1 in the Party of Regions' stronghold Kharkiv,
Yushchenko came out clearly against prolongation, citing the constitutional
ban on foreign bases and the agreement's 2017 expiry deadline as definitive:
"There is no point mulling over this issue anymore, let's put a full stop to
it." Ukraine will fully observe the 1997 agreements, expects Russia to do
the same, and meanwhile it seeks repossession of Russian-used lighthouses
and other installations, Yushchenko declared.  All differences will be
discussed in the Putin-Yushchenko commission, "but let no one try to revise
those agreements or do anything that would turn our relations into something
other than good-neighborly" (Interfax-Ukraine, Itar-Tass, November 1).

Equally clearly, Yanukovych is now speaking in favor of prolonging the stay
of Russia's Fleet: "Ukraine has an interest in our partners operating some
naval installations, as this will bring in revenue....A decision will depend
on how beneficial and necessary this will be to both Ukraine and Russia. The
[prolongation] issue will be considered in the framework of Ukraine's
political and economic relations with Russia....Unquestionably, Ukraine is
interested in good relations with Russia" (Interfax-Ukraine, Itar-Tass,
November 2).

On the institutional level, the Regions-led coalition seeks a transfer of
prerogatives from the presidency and the presidentially controlled Foreign
Affairs and Defense Ministries to the coalition-controlled parliament and
government. A joint working group of the Party of Regions, Socialist, and
Communist parties is well advanced in drafting a new law on the foundations
of the state's domestic and foreign policies. Ever since this government's
formation in August, Yanukovych and his allies have cited a constitutional
stipulation that the parliament "determines the foundations of domestic and
foreign policies" to question the president's authority over foreign policy.
By now, they want to turn that vague stipulation into a clear-cut law not
just questioning, but counterbalancing and even reducing the president's
authority in that domain. According to Yanukovych, the new law will take
account of the constitutional reform and the consequent redistribution of
competencies from the presidency to the parliament and government
(Interfax-Ukraine, October 30, November 3).

On November 3, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a resolution to summon the
presidentially appointed ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense, Borys
Tarasyuk and Anatoliy Hrytsenko, to report on their activities to a plenary
session of parliament on November 15. The 241 votes of the Regions,
Socialist, and Communist parties were sufficient to pass this resolution.
Yushchenko has termed the planned sitting an "inquisition" (Channel Five TV,
One Plus One TV [Kyiv], November 3).

The Rada's majority coalition took that step promptly on Yanukovych's cue.
Yanukovych had declared on November 1 and 2 that he has differences over
foreign policy with Tarasyuk; that the latter cannot remain a minister and
the leader of an opposition party (Rukh, within the bloc Our Ukraine) at the
same time; that "the situation "must be resolved very soon; and that, while
the two ministers' appointment and dismissal is not within the government's
competency, the parliament should take up that issue citing its authority to
"determine the foundations" of policies  (Interfax-Ukraine, November 1, 2).

Major elements in the Party of Regions and allied parties deeply resent
Tarasyuk as a symbol of Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic orientation and Hrytsenko
for his efficient implementation of NATO-assisted military reforms. Moscow
almost certainly seeks the removal of these ministers.

Meanwhile, Yanukovych is building up a strong professional staff on foreign
and national security policy, mainly drawn from ex-president Leonid Kuchma's
administration and governments (Interfax-Ukraine, November 3; Glavred,
November 4). The goal is to duplicate and counterbalance the presidentially
controlled structures (National Security and Defense Council, the
Presidential Secretariat), encroaching on the president's constitutional
authority on that front as well.

On a symbolic level, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a statement of solidarity
with Cuba's regime (referenced as "the people") on November 3, the same day
as the summons to Tarasyuk and Hrytsenko. Out of 436 deputies registered for
the sitting, 318 voted in favor of the statement on Cuba (Interfax-Ukraine,
November 3). Russia's Duma also adopted a declaration of solidarity with
Cuba on that same day.

Some of the protagonists of these efforts heralded their intentions in
Moscow just before taking action in Kyiv to take foreign policy under their
control. Yanukovych announced those intentions in a wide-ranging interview
with the governmental Rossiiskaya gazeta on October 30. Deputy Prime
Minister Dmytro Tabachnyk, writing in the October 27 issue of the
governmental Rossiyskiye vesti, charged that the European integration
rhetoric of certain Ukrainian officials largely "covers up" the wish to join
NATO. Ukrainian and Georgian membership in NATO "would allow Washington
fully to control the energy transit to Europe and severely restrict Russia's
political and economic leeway in the Black Sea region," Tabachnyk warned.
Arguing that Western Europe does not want Ukraine in the European Union,
partly in deference to Russia and partly due to the EU's own enlargement
pause, Tabachnyk argues that "Ukraine's European vector must be
substantially corrected."

Following his mid-October visit to Moscow, Rada Chairman Oleksandr Moroz is
also explicitly espousing a two-vector policy while becoming openly critical
of NATO and the United States. In a speech to Kyiv students, Moroz claimed,
"NATO is not coping with the post-9/11 challenges" and that "Ukraine's entry
into NATO is being advocated by only one superpower, in pursuit of its own
geopolitical interests. We must not become a bargaining card" (Interfax-
Ukraine, October 27).

Thus, an effort to change Ukraine's external orientation seems to be
suddenly and openly gathering force on several fronts simultaneously.

--Vladimir Socor 

New York Times  (link)
Art Review | 'Crossroads: Modernism in Ukraine' 
Ukrainian Modernists, All Alone, Here at Last 
       
By GRACE GLUECK 
Published: November 4, 2006 
Don't mistake them for Russians: Kazimir Malevich, El Lissitsky, Alexander
Rodchenko, Alexander Archipenko and Alexandra Exter were actually born, or
identified themselves as, Ukrainian. According to a new exhibition at the
ambitious Ukrainian Museum, it was the Ukrainian-ness of some of the greats
in modern Russian art that informed their contributions to the Modernist
movements of the 20th century....

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/04/arts/design/04ukra.html
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/04/arts/design/04ukra.html> 



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