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[Deychak, Orest]

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Ukraine: Will Presidential Party Split Over Ruling Coalition? 
By Jan Maksymiuk 
President Yushchenko could see his bloc in parliament dissolve beneath him

PRAGUE, September 13, 2006 (RFE/RL) -- The Reforms and Order Party surprised
fellow Our Ukraine constituents when it recently announced it was switching
alliances and entering the opposition in order to avoid a partnership with a
government it accused of posing a threat to democracy.

What is taking place in Our Ukraine can be described as the final stage in
the disintegration of the Orange Revolution camp that helped bring Viktor
Yushchenko to the presidential post in December 2004. 

Breakup Of The Orange Revolution

The Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc was the first to leave the pro-presidential
alliance, in September 2005, after Yushchenko removed Tymoshenko from the
post of prime minister.   
"It is quite apparent that there are diametrically opposing views regarding
this issue in Our Ukraine, as well as opposite trends regarding the
development of Our Ukraine itself."

When the Party of Regions, led by Yushchenko's erstwhile presidential rival,
Viktor Yanukovych, won the parliamentary elections in March, an opportunity
arose for Yushchenko and Tymoshenko to reunite in an effort to prevent
Yanukovych from returning to power. 

But as old political wisdom asserts, being in opposition unites, while being
in power divides. Lingering animosities and personal ambitions prevented the
leaders of the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc, Our Ukraine, and the Socialist Party
from resurrecting their 2005 ruling alliance. 

Thus, the second force to quit the Orange Revolution camp was the Socialist
Party led by Oleksandr Moroz. The Socialists unexpectedly switched sides in
July, signing an "anticrisis" accord with the Party of Regions and the
Communists. 

Lack Of Unity

Yushchenko then tried to salvage the situation by having Our Ukraine sign a
declaration of national unity with the anticrisis coalition. That deal
allowed Our Ukraine to obtain several ministerial portfolios in Yanukovych's
cabinet and represented a symbolic agreement between the signatories to
pursue the basic goals and ideals of the Orange Revolution. 

Running the government jointly with the Communist Party, however, has turned
out to be an unpalatable idea for many Our Ukraine politicians. Only 30 of
Our Ukraine's 80 lawmakers voted in August to confirm Yanukovych as prime
minister, despite the fact that the bloc delegated four ministers to his
cabinet, in addition to three ministers appointed by Yushchenko. 

Mykola Katerynchuk, the chairman of the executive board of the Our Ukraine
People's Union (NSNU) -- which constitutes the core of the Our Ukraine
parliamentary bloc -- suggested that those NSNU members who backed
Yanukovych in the vote should leave the union. 

But this proposal was criticized by NSNU leader Roman Bezsmertnyy, who is in
favor of Our Ukraine joining the anticrisis coalition on the basis of a new
coalition accord. 

Outright Opposition

How to do this, however, is a major headache for Yushchenko's loyalists. 

Lawmaker Mykhaylo Pozhyvanov from the People's Rukh of Ukraine, another
important component of Our Ukraine, told RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service that his
party took a "very stiff position" on a potential expanded coalition. 

"We see the possibility of forming a new coalition, but only if it was done
simultaneously with a full reformatting of the leadership of the Verkhovna
Rada and the government. To which, I think, these guys [from the anticrisis
coalition] will never agree," Pozhyvanov said. "And [we want a coalition]
without the Communists. It is a very stiff position. It has not gained much
favor with Borys Ivanovych [Bezsmertnyy], but it was approved by voting." 

The Reforms and Order Party from the Our Ukraine bloc has overtly switched
to the opposition, charging that Yanukovych's government poses "a direct
threat to democracy, the national-cultural self-identification and
development of the nation, and fundamental principles of the Ukrainian
statehood." 

Deal Possible?

However, others from Our Ukraine, like former National Security and Defense
Secretary Petro Poroshenko, have not lost hope of making a deal with the
anticrisis coalition.

"Everything depends on the efficiency of the negotiating process,"
Poroshenko said. "I can't say that the negotiations are running very
smoothly. There were different views regarding both the name and principles
of the coalition -- it has to be a new coalition. It is very much a matter
of principle [for us] to include the programmatic provisions of the
declaration of national unity into the coalition agreement." 

Some Ukrainian political commentators and analysts, like Kostyantyn Maleyev
of the Kyiv-based Philosophical Institute of the National Academy of
Sciences, believe that Our Ukraine will not be able to reach a unifying
conclusion on what position to take on working with Yanukovych's cabinet. 

"It is quite apparent that there are diametrically opposing views regarding
this issue in Our Ukraine, as well as opposite trends regarding the
development of Our Ukraine itself," Maleyev said. "It seems that these
contradictions cannot be overcome in the future." 

Marriage Of Convenience

In theory, Yanukovych does not need Our Ukraine's support in parliament --
his Party of Regions, the Socialists, and the Communists jointly control 240
votes in the 450-seat Verkhovna Rada, which is sufficient to pass most
legislation. 

In practice, however, backing from Our Ukraine may be needed to introduce
some economic measures where the views of the Marxism-rooted Communists and
Socialists differ from those of the pro-market Party of Regions. 

In addition, Yanukovych may need Our Ukraine in the ruling coalition as a
sort of legitimization of his government in the eyes of the West. 

But irrespective of the final outcome of this coalition-building story, it
is already evident that the pro-presidential Our Ukraine, which several
months ago stood a realistic chance of dictating its own conditions for the
government, will now have to reconcile itself to the status of a secondary
political force. 

Our Ukraine's political weight may be diminished even further by lawmakers
who choose to switch to the opposition and side with the Yuliya Tymoshenko
Bloc. According to cautious estimates, there may be around 20 such
defectors. 

(RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service correspondent Tetyana Yarmoshchuk contributed to
this report.)

Eurasia Daily Monitor
Tuesday, September 12, 2006 -- Volume 3, Issue 167
UKRAINE: BACK TO STRATEGIC SQUARE ONE
Cohabitation of the Party of Regions with a minority Orange faction and a
Regions-dominated government would seem to mark a shift in Ukraine's foreign
policy paradigm: from the Euro-Atlantic orientation proclaimed by the
short-lived Orange Revolution, back to the Kuchma era (1994-2004) "two
vectors" paradigm of balancing between Russia and the West. This setback
directly affects key aspects of Ukraine-West relations, such as the
prospects of NATO membership for Ukraine.
On the other hand, the paradigm change raises the question of whether
efforts to meet NATO membership criteria might not after all turn out to be
more effective as one component in a two-vector policy, rather than adopting
a single pro-Western vector under an inept presidency.
President Viktor Yushchenko's reported wish to appoint the loyalist ex-prime
minister Yuriy Yekhanurov as Secretary of the National Security and Defense
Council would (if carried out) continue the tendency toward lowering the
NSDC's effectiveness and professionalism. Yushchenko set the NSDC on that
downward path by appointing personal and business allies such as Petro
Poroshenko and Anatoly Kinakh -- who, like Yekhanurov, have no background in
international or national security affairs -- as NSDC secretaries in quick
succession during 2005 and 2006. The current NSDC Acting Secretary,
Volodymyr Horbulin, could have been one of the most inspired appointments of
the Yushchenko presidency, but he cannot continue serving because he has
exceeded the mandatory retirement age. Horbulin, a close ally of former
president Leonid Kuchma, served with distinction in that post during the
Kuchma era, when Ukraine's cooperation with NATO advanced far more
effectively than was the case during the short-lived Orange era.
At policy conferences and strategy sessions, those disappointed with the
unfulfilled Orange promise seek to relativize the return to a two-vector
paradigm by developing what may be termed ex post facto consolation points.
Such consolation points center on the following assertions:
-- The returning prime minister Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions
are "not pro-Russian"; "Ukraine is not Russia"; and "Ukraine is not going
the way of Belarus." Such arguments, while undoubtedly correct as far as
they go, would seem to set a rather low threshold for satisfaction with the
political outcome of the Orange era. "Ukraine is not Russia" is a Kuchma
motto and title of the book he published in 2004.
-- "Even Kuchma resisted Russian proposals to hand over the gas transit
system to Gazprom's control," hence the Regions-dominated government would
not do so either. While the factual assertion is correct, the corollary may
not be so. In fact, Yushchenko's energy team and the Yekhanurov government
initially set the stage for such a transfer through the RosUkrEnergo deal,
and an actual transfer of local gas distribution systems to Russian
interests began as the new government took office in August. The new
government says that it would not hand over control of the strategic transit
pipelines, however.

 -- "Having the Party of Regions in government is a preferable situation to
having that party agitate in the opposition against Ukraine's NATO
candidacy." The Verkhovna Rada did, after all, vote in August to admit
foreign troops for exercises on Ukrainian territory. While the first
argument is probably valid tactically, its strategic validity seems far from
certain. The Party of Regions is for "cooperation" with NATO but against
membership, the latter being in any case a distant possibility. The Rada did
admit British, Slovak, and Moldovan troops, as well as a Russian-commanded
naval squadron from five Black Sea riparian countries, for exercises in
August-September. However, the presidency mismanaged and the Party of
Regions sabotaged the legislative process that would have been required for
approval of far larger military exercises with American and other forces
from NATO countries in Ukraine in May through August 2006. The Verkhovna
Rada had voted the necessary authorizations for such exercises on an annual
basis since 1997 and can again be expected to do so from now onward.

-- With public support for NATO membership currently in the range of only
15-20%, Ukraine can hopefully regain the 30-35% level that was recorded in
the late 1990s, the argument goes. Thus, Ukraine-NATO relations in the
Kuchma era are again implicitly regarded as a benchmark. Furthermore -- this
argument continues -- some Central European countries in NATO show less than
50% public support for membership at this time or include parties that are
less than pro-Western in coalition governments (Slovakia, Poland), so that
Ukraine is not a singular case, the argument concludes. It seems to overlook
the difference between those countries being inside NATO and Ukraine being
outside of the alliance, as well as the fact that those
less-than-pro-Western parties are minor components of coalition governments
with pro-Western majorities.

-- Ukraine will not engage in any significant military exercises with Russia
and keep its distance from the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization,
according to a further consolation point. While probably on target, this
forecast again means a return to the situation that existed in the 1990s in
this respect.

It is now clear that NATO's November 2006 Riga summit will not approve a
Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Ukraine. However, the missed date is no
serious cause for disappointment. Such disappointment would seem, rather, to
reflect a Washington tendency to tie policy to summit events. In fact,
Ukraine can receive its MAP next year, conditional on adequate -- and
adequately financed -- security sector reforms under the ongoing
NATO-Ukraine programs.

For now, Ukraine seems to have reverted to the strategic square one of the
pre-2004 era, with its two-vector policy between Russia and the West and
cooperation with NATO, short of early membership, although with a realistic
prospect of eventual membership contingent on performance.

--Vladimir Socor


OSCE PRESS RELEASE
 
OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine to help Central Election Commission
improve election procedures
 
KYIV, 11 September 2006 - The OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine will work
together with the Central Election Commission (CEC) to develop a central
voter registry, increase the legal awareness of the public, improve election
procedures, and help systemize election legislation.
 
An agreement on this has been singed in Kyiv today.
 
"This agreement shows the determination of Ukraine to comply with OSCE
commitments and promptly follow up on recommendations of the OSCE's Office
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights," said Ambassador James
Schumaker, the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine. "We stand ready to
assist the Central Election Commission in every appropriate way."
 
Yaroslav Davydovych, the Chairman of the CEC, added that the OSCE has proved
to be a reliable partner for Ukraine in the sphere of elections during the
past years. "I greatly appreciate and value our co-operation in making the
Ukrainian election process more fair and transparent," he said.
 
For PDF attachments or links to sources of further information, please
visit: http://www.osce.org/item/20434.html
<http://www.osce.org/item/20434.html>  


Link to Helsinki Commission Co-Chairman Rep. Chris Smith (R-NJ) statement on
15th anniversary of Ukraine's Independence:  www.csce.gov <www.csce.gov> 
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