[Ohio UZO News] Economist;State Department; EDM (2); RFE/RL

[Deychak, Orest]

The Economist
People-trafficking in Odessa
Sea of tears
Sep 21st 2006 | ODESSA
>From The Economist print edition
A hub of the modern slave trade

THE ex-slaves are easy to spot among the passengers disembarking from the
Istanbul ferry at Odessa. As other women wobble merrily away up the Potemkin
steps, the victims of human trafficking look hungry, carry little luggage
and, in winter, shiver in their summer clothes. 

Odessa grew rich in the 19th century by exporting Russian grain. These days
one of its main trades is in flesh. The city is a collecting hub for women
from across the former Soviet Union who, unbeknown to them, have been snared
by traffickers. From Odessa and elsewhere in Ukraine they are conveyed west
to Europe and east to Russia, or south to Turkey and the Middle East. Twice
a week ferries from Istanbul bring back those, often ill and pregnant, who
have been deported by the Turks.

Katya, who is 19, was deposited in Odessa last week by the Southern Palmira,
after a tragically familiar misadventure. Encouraged by a woman she thought
was a friend, she went to Istanbul, expecting work in a restaurant (fake
advertisements are also used for recruitment). To pay off alleged debts, she
says, she found herself turning tricks in a disco. Her friend sold her to a
pimp from another town where, she says, she slept six to a room, was
threatened when she was too tired for sex, and given money only for food.
She was freed by the police (others escape, and some are beaten for trying)
and begged the money for her ferry ticket from an ex-client. Another young
woman, conveyed to Odessa by the Caledonia, says she grew up in an
orphanage, and was taken to Turkey by a woman who promised to adopt her. 

It can be hard, says Natalia Savitskaya, of Faith, Hope and Love, an Odessa
support group, to persuade these women that anyone wants to help them,
rather than entrap them again. The group offers medical, legal and
vocational aid, and helps to repatriate non-Ukrainians. There are
awareness-raising programmes in schools and at the port and airport, plus a
hotline for would-be emigrants. But there are always some, says Ms
Savitskaya, who are convinced that it won't happen to them. 

Poor, neighbouring Moldova is a big source of women. So is Transdniestria,
whose pig-headed authorities refuse to acknowledge the problem. Turkey is
said to have become more sensitive to the crime; other receiving countries,
such as the United Arab Emirates, less so. And the traffickers are
diversifying. Fredric Larsson, of the International Organisation for
Migration in Kiev, says that Russia and Poland have superseded Turkey as the
top destinations. The slaves are now often males forced to work in
construction or agriculture, sometimes with the connivance of local police.
Forced begging and organ removal are also money-spinners. 

Despite changes to Ukrainian law and a dedicated police unit, trafficking
remains a tough crime to prosecute. Even if the recruiters (some of them
former victims) are found, their bosses are often abroad. Many of the
trafficked are reluctant to testify. Most women who land in Odessa are, like
Katya, poorly educated, and often from villages that subsist on remittances
from happier emigrants. Many have been abused at home. It isn't only
poverty, says Inna Tsobenko of Veritas, an educational group. "They want a
beautiful life."

The combination of good looks, naivety and brutal unscrupulousness is always
profitable. Several buildings in Odessa are adorned with reliefs of two
young girls with nooses round their necks: they hanged themselves, legend
has it, after falling prey to white-slave traders.

State Department
Media Note
Office of the Spokesman
Washington, DC
September 21, 2006

Milestone Reached in NATO Partnership for Peace Arms Destruction Project in
Ukraine

The world’s skies were made a little safer this week when the controlled
destruction of 1000 Ukrainian man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS),
was completed on September 20 in northeast Ukraine, outside the city of
Shostka. These weapons, deemed by Ukraine to be excess to its defense needs,
are but the first installment in a 12-year weapons and munitions destruction
project being undertaken by Ukraine and NATO in a NATO-Partnership for Peace
Trust Fund initiative - - the largest such multilateral destruction project
of its kind.

The United States is the lead sponsor of the first three-year phase of this
project to which it already has contributed over $3.64 million. 12 other
countries and the European Union have pledged over €5.6 million
(approximately $7.2 million). Ukraine is providing most of the operational
funding and in-kind support. A total of approximately $27 million will be
required from donors to complete the project. Additional contributions,
including those from non-NATO members, will be welcomed. 

In addition to the MANPADS that were destroyed, 15,000 tons of stockpiled
excess and unstable munitions, including ammunition for automatic weapons,
artillery shells, and mortar rounds, and 400,000 small arms and light
weapons, are scheduled to be destroyed during the first phase. By the end of
the twelve-year project, a total of 1.5 million small arms and light
weapons, and 133,000 tons of munitions will have been safely destroyed. 

The impetus for this extraordinary project is twofold. First, Ukraine has
suffered several major explosions of unstable ordnance in some of its
munitions depots. Controlled destruction of the remaining dangerous ordnance
will reduce the public safety threat and health risk to Ukrainians who live
near such depots. Second, the destruction of weapons and munitions that are
no longer needed by Ukraine to defend itself will ensure that they are never
obtained by illicit arms traffickers, criminals, or terrorists. 

2006/850 


Eurasia Daily Monitor

September 26, 2006

YANUKOVYCH AND ALLIES ASSERTING AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN POLICY

Operating through coalition mechanisms that President Viktor Yushchenko has
helped create, the Party of Regions is de facto appropriating the
president’s formal authority to shape foreign policy. Prime Minister Viktor
Yanukovych’s September 13-14 announcements in Brussels, unilaterally turning
down a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Ukraine, shocked the
pro-Western president and his political allies into a belated attempt at
halting the loss of their authority over foreign policy (see EDM, September
19, 20). However, the prime minister and his coalition partners are openly
ignoring and even rebuking the pro-presidential forces.

On September 19, the Cabinet of Ministers -- heavily dominated by the Party
of Regions and its allies -- issued a resolution of "support for the prime
minister’s stance [in Brussels] as reflecting the common position of the
parliamentary coalition, adhering to the letter and spirit of the [August 3]
National Unity Declaration, and taking account of the views prevailing in
Ukrainian society and the current state of its information [about NATO]"
(UNIAN, September 19).

The Cabinet-invoked parliamentary majority coalition is that of Regions,
Socialists, and Communists, cohabiting with the pro-presidential Our Ukraine
in a government under Regions’ hegemony. That same day, the parliamentary
coalition passed a resolution in the Verkhovna Rada similarly expressing
support for Yanukovych’s renunciation of MAP. The Rada’s chairman, Oleksandr
Moroz, had prefaced the resolution by stating that Yanukovych’s stance at
NATO fully conformed to the terms of the National Unity Declaration.
Approved by 242 deputies out of 321 registered for the session, the
resolution instructs the Rada’s committees on foreign affairs and defense to
draft and submit for voting by November 1 a bill on the procedure for
Ukraine’s accession to military-political alliances. The move seems intended
to add legal hurdles to Ukraine’s possible accession to NATO in the future
(Interfax-Ukraine, September 19-21).

In these resolutions’ aftermath, Yanukovych and the majorities behind him in
parliament and government are adducing two further arguments in their
contest with the president over foreign policy. They cite a constitutional
provision whereby the parliament "determines the principles of domestic and
foreign policy" (Article 85 para. 5, cited by Tammy Lynch, "Yanukovych Heads
to Brussels, Yushchenko Stays Home," ISCIP Analyst, September 21); and,
since the prime minister is responsible to parliament under the amended
constitution, Yanukovych and his allies can claim that their stance on NATO
is covered by the parliament’s authority (Interfax-Ukraine, September 24).

Ever since the presidency went for the deal with Regions in August, it has
optimistically insisted that Yushchenko would retain full authority on
foreign policy based on Article 106 of the constitution. Apparently, the
president did not sufficiently reckon with the majority’s use of Article 85
to countervail Article 106 or with the political consequences of the
redistribution of powers under the amended constitution. 

While in Moscow on September 24, Yanukovych issued an even bolder challenge
to presidential authority on foreign policy. He warned that the parliament
(where he commands majority support with his allies) could "very soon" call
a referendum on the issue of Ukraine joining NATO, "If someone stirs up this
issue and political passions around it" (Itar-Tass, September 24). Such a
referendum would produce an overwhelming vote against joining if held
anytime soon, without adequately and patiently informing the public.
Meanwhile, the new government’s draft budget has cut the funds for
information programs on Euro-Atlantic integration from an already paltry 5.2
million hryvnias in 2006 to 3 million for 2007 (from ca. $1 million to ca.
$600,000) (Zerkalo nedeli, September 16-22).

Yanukovych was already bypassing the president and the relevant ministers
while preparing his visit to NATO headquarters. Not only did he exclude the
ministers of defense and foreign affairs from his delegation, but he also
did not bother to consult them ahead of the visit. Minister of Foreign
Affairs Borys Tarasyuk gave Yanukovych a letter for presentation at NATO
headquarters, affirming Ukraine’s will and preparedness to embark on the
MAP. However, that crucial final paragraph was deleted from the text that
Yanukovych presented at NATO, evidently without asking the minister or the
president (Zerkalo nedeli, September 16-22). Yushchenko tolerated the
exclusion of the presidentially appointed ministers from consultations. He
also failed to call the NSDC in session prior to Yanukovych’s visit to NATO,
when it had already become clear that the prime minister was acting
unilaterally and beyond his statutory remit.

--Vladimir Socor


SIX WAYS FOR YANUKOVYCH AND ALLIES TO CIRCUMVENT YUSHCHENKO ON FOREIGN
POLICY

The accustomed division of prerogatives in Ukraine, whereby the president
handles foreign policy while the prime minister oversees the economy, is no
longer operational. The constitutional reform has shifted the balance of
power in prime minister’s favor. By turning down a NATO-Ukraine Membership
Action Plan, and receiving the support of parliament and government against
the president over this issue, Viktor Yanukovych has just demonstrated that
the prime minister can and will conduct foreign policy in a hands-on style.
President Viktor Yushchenko’s team seemed not to recognize this new reality
when it opted for a governing arrangement with Yanukovych’s Party of
Regions. The presidency continued describing its authority to conduct
foreign policy as the holy of holies of presidential powers. However, it now
seems unable to defend that authority in practice from the prime minister’s
and parliamentary majority’s far-reaching forays.

Following the Cabinet and Rada resolutions in his favor, Yanukovych felt
emboldened enough to tell foreign journalists in Kyiv, "Viktor Andriyovich’s
[Yushchenko] wishes sometimes exceed his possibilities" (Interfax-Ukraine,
September 20). He also cautioned the presidentially appointed ministers of
defense and foreign affairs to "act more correctly," stop mounting the
"political tribunes," coordinate their positions with him and the
government, and limit themselves to expressing consensus views when going
public. Yanukovych tersely ruled out Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko’s
suggestion to implement MAP reforms de facto, without a formal MAP, on the
basis of presidential authority. "That can’t be and won’t be," Yanukovych
retorted, warning that he would impose "strict discipline" in that regard
(Interfax-Ukraine, September 20).

The beleaguered presidency now seems to realize that the vaguely worded
National Unity Declaration -- ostensibly the basis of the governing
coalition -- is no defense against Yanukovych’s and Regions’ expansion of
power. Blindsided by Yanukovych’s move in Brussels, Yushchenko initially
issued a "first political warning" to the prime minister, which the latter
demonstratively ignored. The presidency then considered calling a special
meeting of the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) to reaffirm
Yushchenko’s supreme authority on foreign and defense policies and to
instruct all branches of power to follow the presidential line. Moreover, a
statement by Viktor Baloha, newly appointed head of the Presidential
Secretariat, rebuffed the Rada’s resolution as "provocative,"
"confrontational," and encroaching on the president’s prerogatives
(Interfax-Ukraine, September 19). However, the presidency was quick to
retreat from a confrontation.

The NSDC’s session, held on September 20, introduced a note of realism to
the presidency’s discourse on NATO membership and Yushchenko "would not like
Ukraine to be drawn into senseless discussions about NATO membership, as the
issue is not on the agenda at this stage," he told the country after the
session. The president redefined the issue as involving a determination of
whether Ukraine will be ready for MAP in a follow-up stage of cooperation
with NATO (UNIAN, September 20). The pro-NATO ministers of foreign affairs
and defense, Borys Tarasyuk and Anatoliy Hrytsenko, have fallen back on the
position that Yanukovych’s renunciation of Ukraine’s MAP has no long-term
consequences, but only slowed down Ukraine’s advance toward NATO for the
short term (UNIAN, Interfax-Ukraine, September 22-24).

However, the presidency’s would-be coalition partners have quickly found
mechanisms to offset or bypass the president’s formal authority over foreign
policy. On the legal side, these mechanisms include: the hitherto overlooked
constitutional Article 85, paragraph 5; the prime minister’s responsibility
to a newly empowered parliament; his ability to demand cabinet discipline;
and the parliament’s ability to raise legislative obstacles to Ukraine’s bid
for NATO membership. On the extralegal side, the method just seen consists
of ignoring or even excluding pro-NATO ministers from key deliberations and
delegations. Not used or tested as yet is the circumvention of presidential
policy by under financing military reforms (although public information
funding is already threatened). This can be applied even in the absence of
rhetorical opposition to NATO.

Thus, the debate needs to be substantially recast with account taken of the
shift of political power in the country. It must begin by recognizing that
MAP was no longer available to Ukraine this year after the thwarting of
joint military exercises in early summer, the formation of the Ukrainian
government in its present form, and the full if belated realization of
NATO’s low popularity rating in Ukraine. Ultimately -- as Bruce Jackson,
president of the U.S.-based Project on Transitional Democracies, points out
(Interfax-Ukraine, September 20) -- Yanukovych’s stance in Brussels could
not have been different and becomes in that way comprehensible. The
situation underscores the need to change perceptions in Ukraine’s public
opinion and, equally, to work patiently with the Party of Regions
leadership, educating it to a better understanding of law-based governance
and national interests.

--Vladimir Socor

 
RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
___________________________________________________________

RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol. 10, No. 177, Part II, 25 September 2006

UKRAINE'S TRANSCARPATHIAN RUSYNS WANT OFFICIAL RECOGNITION

By Jan Maksymiuk

Earlier this month, the Transcarpathian Oblast Council appealed to Ukraine's
president, prime minister, and parliamentary speaker to grant Rusyns in the
region an official status of ethnic minority (nationality).

Rusyns, who live in a more or less compact territory in Ukraine, Slovakia,
and Poland, are officially recognized as a minority by Bratislava and
Warsaw, while Kyiv considers them to be a Ukrainian subgroup. Their struggle
for official recognition in Ukraine has continued for more than 15 years
now. 

Similar appeals to grant official recognition to Rusyns in Ukraine were
already issued by the Transcarpathian Oblast Council in

1992 and 2002. But official Kyiv ignored them. 

Will the situation repeat itself this time too? Activists of the People's
Council of Transcarpathian Rusyns (NRRZ), an umbrella organization claiming
to represent the interests of all Rusyns in the oblast, believe that it will
not.

There are at least two reasons for their optimism. First, after President
Viktor Yushchenko came to power and political life in Ukraine became more
democratic, Rusyns in Transcarpathia managed to organize several cultural
events with official support and to present their cause on local television,
where they were allowed to speak in their mother tongue. This year, Rusyns
also opened 26 Sunday schools instructing in the Rusyn language and culture.

Second, the Rusyn movement now seems to have an advocate with meaningful
political leverage in Kyiv: Viktor Baloha, a former Transcarpathian governor
and a former emergency situations minister.

Baloha, a councilor of the Transcarpathian Oblast Council, who backed the
recent appeal for the official recognition of Rusyns, was recently appointed
by President Yushchenko as head of the presidential staff.

NRRZ deputy head Fedir Shandor told RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service that
nationality status for Ukraine's Rusyns would considerably boost their
efforts toward developing their linguistic and cultural heritage, which they
see as distinct from Ukrainian.

"According to the census in December 2001, 10,069 people [in Transcarpathian
Oblast] declared themselves to be Rusyn. Thus, even despite the fact that
such a nationality is not in the [official] register, there are people
considering themselves to be of Rusyn nationality," Shandor says.

According to Shandor, the most urgent tasks for Transcarpathian Rusyns
include launching a regular television program in the Rusyn vernacular,
establishing a chair of Rusyn studies at a university in Uzhhorod, the
capital of Transcarpathian Oblast, and working out a standardized version of
the written Rusyn language.

Some estimates say there may be as many as 1.5 million people of Rusyn
origin, first of all in Ukraine, Slovakia, Poland, the United States, and
Canada. But their Rusyn identity is generally weak, primarily because Rusyns
have never had their own state or political independence. 

The history of Rusyns, Eastern Slavic inhabitants of the Carpathian
Mountains, is quite convoluted and subject to many scholarly controversies. 

Throughout the 19th century and until World War I, when overwhelmingly rural
and agricultural Rusyns produced their own intelligentsia and articulated
the idea of their ethnic distinctiveness, their fatherland, Transcarpathia
(Carpathian Rus), belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

After World War I and the breakup of the Austro-Hungary, most of
Transcarpathia found itself within the borders of Czechoslovakia, where
Rusyns enjoyed a sort of self-rule with their own governor, schools, a
national anthem, and a national theater.

After World War II, most of Transcarpathia was annexed by the Soviet Union,
which did away with the idea of Rusyn distinctiveness and declared all
Rusyns to be Ukrainians. The communist regimes in post-World War II
Czechoslovakia and Poland adopted the Soviet line and also decreed that
Rusyns within their borders were Ukrainians.

Rusyns reemerged after the collapse of the communist system in Poland and
Slovakia and the breakup of the Soviet Union. A census in Slovakia in 2001
registered 24,000 Rusyns, up from 17,000 Rusyns registered in a census 10
years earlier. A census in Poland in 2002 found that there were 6,000 Lemkos
(local name for Rusyns) in the country.

The officially established numerical strength of Rusyns is not particularly
impressive but the general trend seems to be propitious for them -- having
started from nil, Rusyns continue to gain in number.

Shandor believes that the official unwillingness to grant recognition to
Rusyns tarnishes Ukraine's international image. "It is very important for
Ukraine to register this nationality, in order to avoid various
manipulations at the level of the European Union,"

Shandor says. "There is a league of unrepresented peoples [the Unrepresented
Nations and Peoples Organization], which creates a negative image for
Ukraine in connection with the fact that the Rusyn nationality is not
recognized."

According to a final document of the meeting of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe in Copenhagen in 1990, "to belong to a national
minority is a matter of a person's individual choice." Moreover, the
document says that "persons belonging to national minorities can exercise
and enjoy their rights individually as well as in community with other
members of their group."

But many Ukrainians, including intellectuals and academics, would argue
whether European standards could be applied to Rusyns in Ukraine. One of
them is Mykola Zhulynskyy, director of the Institute of Literature in
Ukraine's National Sciences Academy. "I think that in this case the European
experience is of no use. This is simply a big problem that arose in
connection with the fact that Ukraine had not been united, that she had been
torn apart by different empires.

[The Rusyns constitute] the indivisible Ukrainian body," Zhulynskyy says.

However, historical arguments can also be used to question Zhulynskyy's
reasoning, if not to discard it altogether. As little as a century ago, many
Russians used to argue in almost the same way, asserting that Ukrainians
("Little Russians") and Belarusians ("White Russians") constituted "the
indivisible Russian body."

Now that Ukrainians have an independent state, do they really need to behave
toward their own "younger brothers" -- Transcarpathian Rusyns -- like their
erstwhile oppressor, tsarist Russia, behaved toward them?

(RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service correspondent Nadiya Petriv contributed to this
report.)

 

 

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: /pipermail/uzonews_clevelanduzo.org/attachments/20060926/3c9396f6/attachment.html