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Eurasia Daily Monitor

December 13, 2007 -- Volume 4, Issue 231

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TYMOSHENKO VOTE SHOWS COALITION'S LIMITATIONS
 
The coalition of President Viktor Yushchenko's Our Ukraine-People's
Self-Defense bloc (NUNS) and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT) has failed
to ensure Tymoshenko's return to the post of prime minister, from which
Yushchenko fired her in fall 2005. This time it is not disagreements
within the coalition that stand in her way, but what looks like a glitch
of the "Rada" electronic voting system and the opposition's
determination to capitalize on it. Tymoshenko's bid for prime minister
was supported by exactly half of parliament - but not a majority.
 
The voting on Tymoshenko on December 11 demonstrated that the BYuT-NUNS
coalition will have to fight for every important issue in the newly
elected parliament, as it numbers 227 members, just one vote more than
the simple majority needed to pass laws in the 450-seat legislature. The
opposition - the Party of Regions (PRU), the Communists, and the Lytvyn
Bloc - refused to cast a single vote for Tymoshenko, so all members of
NUNS - even those who happened to be seriously ill - had to come to
parliament.
 
Their turnout was in vain. Tymoshenko mustered 225 votes, just one short
of her premiership. Two coalition members complained that, for some
reason, their votes "in favor" were not counted by the electronic voting
system. Rada Speaker Arseny Yatsenyuk, despite loud protests from the
opposition, ruled to re-vote. At that point, PRU deputy Vladyslav
Lukyanov snatched the speaker's voting card. Without Yatsenyuk's vote,
the Rada displayed the figure 225 again. In addition, another coalition
member claimed that his vote was not counted.
 
The opposition did not allow a re-vote. Furious, NUNS and BYuT claimed
that the opposition had tampered with the Rada system and threatened
Lukyanov with criminal prosecution. The PRU, however, defended Lukyanov,
saying that he had only prevented a procedural violation. Technical
experts interviewed by Channel 5 said that the Rada system could not
possibly be tampered with. They suggested that the incident during the
voting was an unfortunate coincidence. After checking the voting system
the Security Service reported that nothing suspicious was found.
 
Yesterday, December 12, Yushchenko again submitted Tymoshenko's
nomination to parliament. The opposition, however, blocked the session
hall. The PRU said that the December 11 voting was just a one-off
concession to the coalition, and now they want parliament to continue
working according to the usual procedure, which stipulates that the
parliament speaker and deputy speakers should be elected and standing
committees should be formed before voting on a new prime minister. Only
the speaker has been elected so far. It is not clear when parliament
will vote on Tymoshenko's bid again if the opposition does not drop
their demand.
 
The composition of Tymoshenko's future cabinet has already been made
public. It is not ruled out, however, that some changes may be made to
the list by the time of Tymoshenko's appointment. Her proposed cabinet
will include representatives of the BYuT and NUNS in equal proportion.
The foreign and defense ministers are picked by the president, as this
is his privilege according to the constitution.
 
The four deputy prime ministers designated by Tymoshenko are: Oleksandr
Turchynov, her key ally since the late 1990s, when both were on the team
of former prime minister Pavlo Lazarenko, who was later imprisoned in
the United States for graft; Ivan Vasyunyk, a former deputy head of
Yushchenko's office; Yosyp Vinskyy, a former number two in the Socialist
Party, who left the Socialists when they abandoned Yushchenko and
Tymoshenko and joined Yanukovych's camp in 2006; and Hryhory Nemyrya, a
foreign relations expert who has accompanied Tymoshenko on foreign
trips.
 
Yushchenko's choice for defense minister was a surprise for many, as it
had been expected that Anatoly Hrytsenko, who survived several cabinets
in this position since 2005, would stay. Instead, Yushchenko picked
Yuriy Yekhanurov, who succeeded Tymoshenko as prime minister in
2005-2006. Yekhanurov opposed the alliance with Tymoshenko, preferring a
"grand" coalition with the PRU. Vadym Karasyov, an analyst close to
Yushchenko's team, told Channel 5 (5 Kanal) that Yekhanurov would be a
counterbalance to Tymoshenko in the cabinet. He also suggested that
Hrytsenko might be promoted to secretary of the National Security and
Defense Council.
 
Yushchenko's choice for foreign minister is Volodymyr Ohryzko, a
pro-Western diplomat who served as deputy foreign minister in several
cabinets. Ohryzko's appointment may not play well in Moscow, as he has
been a tough negotiator on border issues and the Black Sea Fleet for
many years. Ohryzko does not miss opportunities to challenge Russians
even in matters of secondary importance. He once sparked a scandal by
refusing to speak Russian at a meeting with Russian experts who
complained that their poor understanding of Ukrainian hindered normal
dialogue.
 
Yuriy Lutsenko, who spearheaded the anti-corruption drive immediately
after the December 2004 Orange Revolution, is slated to return to the
post of interior minister. Viktor Pynzenyk, who has served in many
Ukrainian cabinets since the early 1990s, should return to the chair of
finance minister. Vasyl Kremin, who was education minister for many
years under former president Leonid Kuchma, should be education minister
again.

(Ukrayinska pravda, Channel 5, December 11-12)
 

--Pavel Korduban

 

 

Kyiv Post

www.kyivpost.com <http://www.kyivpost.com/> 

 

Opinion > Op-Ed  


Counterpoint to the counterfactual: another view of Yushchenko's legacy


Dec 12 2007, 23:10

If Yushchenko had acted the way the majority of the country had
anticipated after the Orange Revolution, Ukraine would be on track to
join the EU and NATO 

By Taras KUZIO

The "what ifs" of history are a dangerous area to argue in support of
Viktor Yushchenko's alleged successes in his presidency. 

Yushchenko's popularity is lower than 20 percent, a level at which we
would consider a Western president to be a lame duck (such as former
President Jacques Chirac and current President George W. Bush). Usually
a president becomes a lame duck in his second or subsequent term, not in
his first term, as in Ukraine.

Here are some alternative what ifs of recent Ukrainian history from a
blogger's point of view.

If Prime Minister Yushchenko and his national democratic allies in
parliament had withdrawn their support from President Leonid Kuchma
during the Kuchmagate crisis and backed calls by the Yulia Tymoshenko
bloc and the Socialists for his impeachment, Kuchma would have been
forced to step down early. Until early presidential elections,
Yushchenko would have been acting head of state. 

Yushchenko, however, signed a document with parliamentary speaker Ivan
Pliushch and President Leonid Kuchma denouncing the protestors as
"fascists."

If then Prime Minister Yushchenko had supported Deputy Prime Minister
Tymoshenko, she may have not been arrested in January 2001. Yushchenko
should have resigned in protest at her arrest.

If parliament had not voted no confidence in the Yushchenko government
in April 2001, his government may have stayed on until the end of
Kuchma's term. Yushchenko would have supported a presidential request to
be Kuchma's official successor. 

If Yushchenko had not agreed to constitutional reforms during the
December 2004 round tables, there would never have been constitutional
chaos in 2006-2007 and the disbanding of parliament in spring 2007. If
the president had used his extensive powers under the 1996 Constitution
to fulfill Orange Revolution demands during his first year in office,
his popularity would not have collapsed. Yushchenko had millions of
supporters on the streets of Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities, but
betrayed them in signing deals at the round tables.

If the Tymoshenko government had not been removed in September 2005, and
a memorandum had not been signed that month between Yushchenko and
Viktor Yanukovych [Yuschenko's arch-rival in the 2004 presidential
elections when Yanukovych was prime minister, Ukraine's current acting
prime minister, and the leader of the Party of Regions - Eds. Note], the
Party of Regions would never have doubled its popularity to come first
in the 2006 parliamentary elections. 

If the Tymoshenko government had not been removed, the Orange parties
would never have been divided for 18 months. If a united presidential
party had been created, Our Ukraine might not have reduced its
popularity by 10 percent in the 2006 and 2007 parliamentary elections,
in comparison to 2002. 

If an Orange coalition had been created in 2006, the Communist Party
would never have entered government in the Anti-Crisis Coalition [formed
between the Party of Regions, the Socialist Party and the Communist
Party - Eds. Note].

If Sviatoslav Piskun had not been maintained by President Yushchenko as
Prosecutor General in 2005, the "bandits" may have gone to prison,
rather than to parliament and government. 

If Mykhailo Potebenko, Borys Kolesnikov and Serhiy Kivalov had been
criminally charged, Yushchenko could never have rehabilitated them with
state medals. 

If Yushchenko had not protected Kuchma from impeachment and prosecution
on two occasions, Kuchma would have been criminally charged with abuse
of office. In the Kuchmagate crisis, Prime Minister Yushchenko refused
to back calls for Kuchma's impeachment, and during the 2004 round table
negotiations, Kuchma was granted immunity in exchange for Yushchenko's
election as president.

If Yushchenko had fulfilled his promises made to the Council of Europe,
he would have put the organizers of the murder of Heorhiy Gongadze on
trial. Instead, one suspect has fled from Ukraine, another allegedly
committed "suicide," and a third sits comfortably in retirement. Three
lower-ranking policemen were charged in a closed trial.

If the president had heeded US calls to quickly create an Orange
coalition after the 2006 elections, Ukraine would have been invited into
a Membership Action Plan at NATO's Riga summit in November 2006. Ukraine
would have then been on target to have been invited to join NATO at the
2008 Bucharest NATO summit. If Yushchenko had supported the Tymoshenko
government and an Orange coalition in 2006, Ukraine would have joined
the WTO earlier.

Ukraine would not have increased its dependency on Russian energy if it
had not signed up to a 2006 gas deal that included the corrupt and
non-transparent RosUkrEnergo intermediary. During the gas crisis,
Ukraine conducted negotiations incompetently, while ignoring massive
Western support for Ukraine and criticism of Russian policies.

If the president had fulfilled his 2004 election promises and
implemented the promises given on the Maidan during the Orange
Revolution, Yushchenko would have a better chance of winning a second
term in the 2009 elections. 

President Yushchenko cannot win a second term in the 2009 elections by
standing on his five-year record or by only relying on the support of
Our Ukraine (which won 14 percent in the last two elections, but whose
support has now fallen precipitously). He can only win a second term by
aligning himself with either the Tymoshenko bloc or with the Party of
Regions and by using negative campaigning depicting himself as the
'lesser of two evils.' Yushchenko's record in his first term is poor in
the eyes of Ukrainian voters and, therefore, he has little choice but to
repeat Kuchma's 1999 strategy of convincing voters to back the alleged
'lesser of two evils.' 

If he chose an alliance with Tymoshenko, the Yushchenko campaign would
again aim to block a Yanukovych victory (as in 2004, when many Orange
voters voted against Yanukovych rather than for Yushchenko). 

Alternatively, if he chose to fight the 2009 elections in an alliance
with the Party of Regions, the Yushchenko campaign would target
Tymoshenko's alleged "populism" and penchant for irrationality.

If Yushchenko were to align himself with the Party of Regions in the
2009 elections, he would lose all remnants of his Orange support and
most likely lose the elections. Yushchenko would then follow Leonid
Kravchuk in only having served one term in office.

Dr. Taras Kuzio is a Research Associate, Institute for European, Russian
and Eurasian Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, George
Washington University. Dr. Kuzio's commentary is a response to "Ukraine
without Viktor Yushchenko: a counterfactual history, or 'What if?'," by
Adrian Karatnycky, which was published in the Dec. 6 issue of the Kyiv
Post.

(Note:  Adrian Karatnycky's article was sent out in my previous mailing.
OD)  

See Helsinki Commission website - www.csce.gov <http://www.csce.gov/> ,
for recent articles, press releases, including: 

 

Hastings Outraged by Merciless Attack on Belarus' Young Front Leader
Zmitser Fedaruk, December 12, 2007 

 

Is It Torture Yet? (Hearing) 

Cardin and Hastings Examine U.S. Policy on Torture
December 10, 2007



Ukraine's Pre-Term Parliamentary Elections and Demonstrable Commitment
to Democratic Standards focus of Commission Initiatives (Article)
December 6, 2007
By Orest Deychakiwsky and Ronald McNamara The Helsinki Commission
undertook several initiatives ...

 

The Duma Elections, Politics and Putin: Where is Russia Going?
(Briefing), 

December 6, 2007

 

 

 

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