[Ohio UZO News] Yuliya Elected PM: AP, FT; State Department; EDM

[Deychak, Orest]

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EU POL Ukraine Prime Minister; Ukraine's parliament elects pro-Western Yulia Tymoshenko as prime minister 

By MARIA DANILOVA 

Associated Press Writer

18 December 2007

08:52 AM

KIEV, Ukraine (AP) - Ukraine's parliament elected Yulia Tymoshenko, the fiery and controversial heroine of the Orange Revolution, as prime minister Tuesday, a move that could accelerate the former Soviet republic's push to become closer to the West. 

Tymoshenko got 226 votes -- the bare majority needed in the 450-member parliament -- from deputies in her bloc and the party of President Viktor Yushchenko. Tymoshenko and the president formed a majority coalition after elections late last year, despite frequent tensions between the two. 

Before the vote in the Verkhovna Rada, Tymoshenko vowed that the coalition would defend the country's national interests and implement reforms. 

"You have real patriots in politics who will hold this flag up high and never drop it. Today's vote is a moment of truth for the democratic coalition," she said. 

However, the vote count indicated the difficulties ahead of the Yushchenko-Tymoshenko coalition. The opposition dominated by the Party of Regions, which is led by pro-Russia former prime minister Viktor Yanukovych, is in strong position to fight initiatives by the Western-leaning reformist coalition. 

Loyalties switch frequently in Ukrainian politics, and an attempt to return Tymoshenko to the premiership in 2006 derailed when a formerly allied party crossed over to join a coalition with Party of Regions. 

Party of Regions lawmaker Hanna Herman predicted the coalition would not last long, saying "the earlier they come, the earlier they'll leave." 

Yanukovych later told the parliament "We remember well how the 'Orange Team' destroyed the economy and began redistributing property." 

Tymoshenko was the most energetic and vivid figure of the 2004 Orange Revolution mass protests that helped power Yushchenko into the presidency. The protests broke out after a fraud-plagued presidential election in which Yanukovych was declared the winner. The Supreme Court annulled the election, and Yushchenko won the rerun. 

The Orange Revolution left her and Yushchenko in deep opposition to Yanukovych, who returned as prime minister in 2006. Yushchenko this year accused Yanukovych of trying to usurp power and called early elections; his and Tymoshenko's parties together wracked up a narrow majority of seats in the September vote. 

Tuesday's vote was held by hand, and counting took more than an hour. The laborious procedure was held in the wake of last week's complaints that a vote on Tymoshenko's nomination -- in which she got only 225 votes -- was invalid due to possible tampering with the parliament's vote-tallying machine. 

U.S. Ambassador William Taylor called Tymoshenko's election a vote for reform. 

"It's great to have a prime minister that we can now deal with, and we hope that this is the first step toward forming a reform-minded government," he said. "We hope there will be a stable government." 

Yushchenko has consistently aimed to reorient the country of 45 million people away from Moscow and toward the West, including pushing for quick membership in NATO and the European Union.

Financial Times

Ukraine parliament backs Tymoshenko for PM

By Roman Olearchyk in Kiev 

Published: December 18 2007 11:47 

Yulia Tymoshenko was on Tuesday endorsed as Ukraine's prime minister after winning a wafer thin majority in a parliamentary vote. The charismatic Ms Tymoshenko will head a pro-western coalition of her political bloc and allies of Ukraine's president, Viktor Yushchenko. 

Ms Tymoshenko will replace Viktor Yanukovich, the Moscow-friendly premier whose year-long tussle over authority with Mr Yushchenko culminated in the president dissolving parliament last spring. 

Ms Tymoshenko regained the premiership after a strong showing in snap elections in September. A previous stint as prime minister in 2005 was cut short by Mr Yushchenko.

Her coalition is expected to rejuvenate the president's hopes of Ukraine joining Nato and the European Union. But Ms Tymoshenko is also expected to shake up relations with Moscow, which has in recent years imposed stiff rises in the price of natural gas exports to Ukraine, a large consumer and key transit artery for Russian supplies to Europe. Ms Tymoshenko has pledged to remove murky intermediaries from the multi-billion-dollar natural gas trade between Kiev Moscow and Central Asian producers. 

Speaking ahead of the vote, Ms Tymoshenko pledged to adopt "deep reforms" and fight corruption. She warned influential business interests that have opposed her that if a vote on her candidacy should fail, "sooner or later the entire mob will have to account before Ukraine for what they have done thus far and what they will do in the future." 

"I think today's vote will be a good test of how corrupt our politics is or isn't " she said. 

After a first vote on her candidacy failed last week due to an alleged tampering with an electronic computerised voting system, Ms Tymoshenko on Tuesday won by a one-vote majority in a show-of-hands. She will lead a razor-thin coalition majority in which trust from pro-presidential lawmakers is weak due to fears that she will use the premier post as a springboard to challenge Mr Yushchenko in a 2010 presidential campaign. 

Ms Tymoshenko's candidacy mustered 226 votes, the minimal requirement for a majority in the 450-seat legislature. Backed by 156 seats in Ms Tymoshenko's Byut bloc and 72 within the pro-presidential Our Ukraine grouping, the coalition marks the first majority held by Mr Yushchenko since he was propelled to the presidency in the 2004 Orange Revolution. 

Voting in parliament to form Ms Tymoshenko's new cabinet is expected later on Tuesday but sources said it could be put off until later this week. 

Ms Tymoshenko's government will seek to maintain the impressive economic growth that Ukraine has seen in recent years, but will also strive to raise average living standards and fend off high inflationary pressures, which were sparked largely by sharp price rises on fuel imports. 

In recent days, Russia's Gazprom has warned of a repeat of the 2006 natural gas supply standoff that triggered supply shortages to Europe could materialise if Ms Tymoshenko pushed to renegotiate an agreement signed late this year by the outgoing government.

In the agreement, Ukraine accepted a third stiff price increase on natural gas supplies in as many years. A repeat standoff poses serious risks for Europe; The majority of Russian supplies to EU countries are pumped through Ukraine's vast pipeline system. 

Andriy Kozhemyakin, an ally of Ms Tymoshenko, said her government would not rush to review the agreement this year, opting instead for pragmatic talks that would start next year. 

Some analysts question how long Ms Tymoshenko's fragile governing coalition will last, saying it could be cut short if she is seen as using the premiership as a springboard to challenge Mr Yushchenko in a presidential campaign that kicks off in 2009. 

"There are growing signs of mistrust between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko, which first appeared back in 2005, and have yet to be repaired," reads a recent report by Renaissance Capital. "Unless she conducts a balanced policy, she may not survive in the position for long." 

Ms Tymoshenko established herself as a major political figure rallying street side protestors during the Orange Revolution in support of Mr Yushchenko's presidential bid. 

The chances of a future clash with Mr Yushchenko are high. Ms Tymoshenko has not clearly ruled out a run for the presidency. Fearing their shadowy privatisation dealings would be reversed, influential oligarchs are said to be pulling strings against her. 

 

The following speech is well-worth reading in its entirety and deserves as wide dissemination as possible.  OD

U.S. Department of State

A Key Moment in Ukraine-American Relations

David J. Kramer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs
Lecture on U.S.-Ukrainian Relations, Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute
Cambridge, Massachusetts
December 7, 2007 

As delivered

Thank you, Professor Hajda, for that kind introduction. And thanks to all you for turning out as well. 

It's good to be back at Harvard, where I studied a country, the Soviet Union, that, I'm pleased to say, no longer exists. Conversely, I'm here to speak to you today about a country that was at the time I was a student a republic only on paper.

Today's date should remind us that events are difficult to forecast. Today is known as the day that will live in infamy, and for those of you who are younger and may not immediately recognize the quote, no, I'm not warning you about my speech. Today of course is the 66th anniversary of Pearl Harbor.

Closer to my line of work, today is the 20th anniversary of Mikhail Gorbachev's arrival in Washington for a key summit with President Reagan, in what became a historic visit many of us remember vividly. Coming after a long line of gray, truculent leaders going back decades, Gorbachev was clearly a new face and, for at least that reason, a breath of fresh air. He wowed Washington publics during the summit, giving his security detail nightmares by bursting out of his limousine to dive into street crowds. It was a seminal event in U.S.-Soviet relations.

I will leave aside for the moment the debate over whether Gorbachev succeeded in freeing Russians, Ukrainians, and others from Stalinism or failed in his plan to reform communism and make the Soviet system permanent by giving it a human face. For us what matters at the moment is what happened.

The result of his years in power is that the Soviet Union broke up, freeing the 15 so-called republics to go their own way. The 15 were all over the map, quite literally, but also in terms of their history, internal cohesiveness and economic development. Not surprisingly, they have met with varying levels of success in terms of economic development, political liberty and the overall happiness of their people.

None of the countries that finally separated themselves from Russia is as populated or as important to regional history-and to Russianness, from the clouded Russian perspective-than Ukraine. Before Russia and Belarus there was Rus, and we all know where that was. It was the princes and princesses of Kyivan Rus who first adopted Christianity. Another country and civilization developed later in the back-woods Duchy of Muscovy, but Ukraine was first.

Today Ukraine can be first again. It has enormous potential, it has all it needs to succeed, to be at the forefront that emerged from the break-up of the Soviet Union in economic and political development. To do so, it must overcome the past and forge headlong into the future, a future Ukraine's nearly 47 million people deserve.

There is some good news. Ukraine has taken an important step forward with the coalition formed by the parties involved in the Orange Revolution. The nomination yesterday of Yuliya Tymoshenko to return as prime minister is another welcome development, as it appears that Ukraine is inching closer to having a new government.

The Orange majority in Parliament would be narrow, but other countries have succeeded in establishing successful governments even under such circumstances. It doesn't make life easy, to be sure, but democracy isn't easy. It's just better than any other system. 

With formation of a new government, it'll be time to get back to business. We are looking forward to a new start, but for that we need a government to talk to. And when there is one, we have a large agenda of bilateral issues. Ukraine, for its part, has no shortage of urgent reforms that need attention.

Prolonged political uncertainty has stalled reform and led to inertia. It has lessened Ukraine's ability to function as a strong partner to Europe and the United States. It hasn't helped that Ukrainian politics has been Byzantine in its complexity and intrigue. The coalition took so long to materialize that for a while there we worried if there was greater urgency to form a Ukrainian government in Washington than in Kyiv.

Sympathetic friends of Ukraine, among whom I count myself, have followed events with frustration. Above all, we thought infighting and delay failed to respect the wishes of the people of Ukraine.

One of our biggest fears was that the bickering would cause some observers to lose interest, to sort of give up on Ukraine and dismiss it as incorrigible, an impossibly convoluted place more trouble than it was worth. Those of us who know the value of this country and its people, worried that it would lose the attention and good will that it so richly deserves.

We comforted ourselves in the knowledge that Ukraine is a functioning democracy, one where elections have real meaning. The politics behind formation of a coalition, choice of a Rada speaker, and nomination of a new government have been peaceful and democratic; that should not be taken for granted. Yes, it's taken a long time, but I'd rather have that than have security forces determine the outcome or see blood spilling onto the streets.

And of course, in an important way, the fact that the vote was so closely contested is a testament to the vibrancy of Ukraine's democracy. The party of the presidency, in fact, came in third. A narrow result is a better sign of democracy's existence than a lop-sided vote in an atmosphere of fear and one-sided media coverage, as we have recently seen elsewhere.

And in fact, in a region where democracy is often under attack, Ukraine stands out for its consistent record of democratic elections and respect for human rights. The media are freer now than they have ever been before. I'm impressed every time I go to Kyiv by the diversity of views and the sense of freedom among journalists. They can report on any issue and no longer fear for their safety or even their lives; the reprehensible murder of journalist Heorhiy Gongadze in 2000 reminds us of how things used to be for the press in Ukraine and how much things have changed for the better. 

This is why, when it comes to the subject of Ukraine, you find strong bipartisanship in Washington. Ever since it became independent in 1991, there has been a consensus in Washington in support of a strong Ukraine.

Now, as everyone knows, there have been ups and downs in our relations during this time. After a warm period in the 1990s, relations went into a period at the start of this decade that was neither complete warmth nor complete hibernation.

The United States never forgot the strategic importance of Ukraine or lost faith in its people. But the scandals, corruption, and human-rights violations of the Kuchma leadership restricted close contact. 

U.S.-Ukrainian relations leapt forward with the Orange Revolution. That event started us on a new trajectory of open dialogue and closer cooperation.

We know that there will be ups and downs. But one lasting result of the Orange Revolution in terms of relations with the U.S in the long term is continued support for Ukraine's aspirations to become a full member of the trans-Atlantic community and integration into its institutions.

The United States wants to see Ukraine solidify its democratic gains and take its place as an integral part of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.

U.S. interests will be served by Ukrainian success. We are not battling anyone else for influence in Ukraine. And let me be clear: We are not in competition with Russia. We don't see things in a zero-sum way, nor do we view our relations with Ukraine through a Russia prism. U.S.-Ukraine relations stand on their own and always will.

Ukraine's own evolution has greatly helped our ties. Following the flawed presidential election that sparked the Orange Revolution, we've witnessed a succession of free and fair elections in Ukraine, the most recent on September 30, 2007. That vote mostly proceeded well, and all parties and candidates had free access to the media beforehand. A large contingent of international observers certified the basic fairness of the election.

Let me, once again, congratulate Ukraine on these achievements. Democracy isn't just holding a vote. Democracy means allowing everyone to have equal access to the media and having the election independently verified. We have international observers, including the OSCE, verify our elections here in this country; Ukraine did the same. So, again, let's give well-deserved kudos to Ukraine. 

The U.S. of course did not take sides in the election. We will work with any government produced from a democratic and legal process. We worked with an Orange government following the Orange Revolution with first Yuliya Tymoshenko then with Yuriy Yekhanurov as prime minister, then worked with an Blue-Red-Pink Coalition with Viktor Yanukovych in the prime minister's seat up until these new elections. We received Prime Minister Yanukovych at very high levels in Washington last December; opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko also paid a visit to Washington this past February. We simply want to work with a government, hence our interest in seeing one formed as quickly as possible. Political infighting is not unique to Ukraine, but it is important that the new government rise above the political competition and personalities and proceed with the important work of reform.

The Orange Revolution was a vote cast by the people for freedom and democracy. It is the first step in a long journey. After the exhilaration of the Revolution came the perhaps less dramatic-but no less important-work of reforming Ukraine's polity, economy, and society.

Ukraine has to prepare itself to become a full-fledged member of the Euro-Atlantic community. Reform is an ongoing process, reform is a road not a destination. But Ukraine has no shortage of incentives to undertake reform.

First, it is what Ukrainians deserve. Second, a reformed Ukraine could become a beacon to the region. Third, a Ukraine that has taken the necessary steps can have a closer relationship with the West.

What are these reforms? The challenges are many. For one, the Orange Revolution lifted expectations very high. Meeting those expectations, perhaps an impossible task for any leadership, will nonetheless require hard work.

Basically, the reforms needed fall under the following three broad areas, chosen in no particular order:

*	The first is energy security. Ukraine is a strategic country in this priority of the first half of the 21st century. 
*	Corruption is the second area where reforms are needed. It is a tax on all citizens and an impediment to development. Building strong institutions is a critical way to address this problem. 
*	Free and open markets is our third and last area. Free markets are the untax; they lower prices on all goods.

Energy Security

I'll start with energy security. Energy is one of the biggest challenges Ukraine faces, getting greater control over its energy security. Energy security means having as much control as possible over your supply of energy.

Ukraine needs to focus its national energy strategy on diversifying its foreign energy suppliers and routes, increasing domestic supply, and improving efficiency.

Our emphasis has been on transparency, diversification, and elimination of middle men, that is companies that for no good reason whatsoever come between the supplier and the consumer.

In order to achieve all three objectives, processes must be transparent and market-based. And in order to do that, Ukraine must get rid of all energy middlemen. Middlemen companies thrive on non-transparent arrangements; they fester in a corrupt environment. They serve no useful purpose. 

And lest I be misunderstood, I mean companies like RosUkrEnergo. We were intrigued by recent comments made by Gazprom Chairman Dmitriy Medvedev when he talked about removing RosUkrEnergo from the energy equation between Russia and Ukraine. During a meeting earlier this week in Washington with a senior Gapzrom official, I heard Medvedev's view echoed. If Russia and Gazprom are willing to eliminate RosUkrEnergo from the equation, then Ukraine should seize this opportunity and move quickly. Yuliya Tymoshenko has been clear on this subject - she wants to eliminate RosUkrEnergo; I have also on occasion heard Viktor Yanukovych say the same thing. The key is not to replace RosUkrEnergo with another middleman company, but to eliminate that kind of role entirely.

Energy supply arrangements in Ukraine, particularly gas, are just not transparent, a reality that ultimately harms Ukraine's energy security.

Critics say that prices would go up significantly, and they might, although the idea that the presence of a middleman would lead to cost savings in this kind of gas supply deal defies credibility. But I think it's also important to point out that there are hidden costs when a company like RosUkrEnergo is allowed to exist in Ukraine, and I think that's something Ukrainian leaders need to look at very seriously.

Ukraine will have to adapt to higher energy prices due to Russian price increases anyway. There is something to be said about getting the pain of higher prices over with sooner rather than later; it has the advantage of providing a kind of liberating effect vis-à-vis Russia. Market forces should determine pipeline routes; oil and gas should flow to where there are buyers.

For every dollar's worth of industrial production, Ukraine consumes about two and a half times as much energy as does Poland; this demonstrates there is much room for improvement on the energy consumption side. Energy conservation, with subsidized prices, has been virtually non-existent. It is simple economics, any good whose consumption is subsidized will be used ineffectively. The new government needs to launch a serious energy conservation campaign, and higher prices should provide a decent incentive to move quickly on that front. 

In order to implement a new energy strategy, Ukraine must attract new technologies, expertise, and investment capital. That approach will lower costs, without the inefficiency associated with subsidization.

To do that Ukraine will need to open up the domestic energy sector, particularly in oil and gas, to international investment. Market pricing will increase efficiency in the allocation of energy resources and the consumption of energy resources. It will make Ukraine a more competitive, stronger country.

Corruption and Institution-Building

Next up in the broad area that needs reform is corruption and institution-building. Corruption remains a major impediment to the achievement of Ukraine's potential.

Helping Ukraine combat corruption is one of our key objectives. Ukrainians need to be able to take an issue to court and expect an impartial outcome based on the law and the facts of the case. U.S. funds are helping both the Ukrainian media and NGOs build their capacities as anti-corruption watchdogs. That's why for fiscal year 2007, U.S. government assistance programs emphasize the reform of the justice system. 

That assistance, by the way, totaled about 100 million dollars. It includes support programs that help Ukraine develop a healthy economy, promote energy security, and build sustainable institutions that advance democratic reform, human rights, and economic growth. 

We are also helping Ukraine to combat HIV/AIDs and tuberculosis.

In response to the tragic explosion in one of Ukraine's deepest mines, which killed 100 people, we are providing aid to help injured miners. We also have an ongoing mine safety program in Ukraine and are working to send more technical experts to help Ukraine avoid such problems in the future

Free Markets

Building off the need to battle corruption, the last broad area where we'd like to see reforms is in opening markets. One indicator of Ukraine's direction toward more integration into the global community has been its work to join the World Trade Organization.

We fully support Ukraine's WTO accession, and I should add that work toward this goal is very well-advanced. Ukraine should achieve accession soon, maybe within months, given that most of the changes needed for Ukraine to accede have been made.

Some work remains to be done, however. The new parliament will need to pass final legislation, and we should all feel relieved that a strong consensus across the political parties exists to do so.

WTO membership will not only provide more market access, it will also spur needed economic reform and increase competitiveness. While Ukraine has enjoyed strong economic growth, for this to be sustained Ukraine needs to become a more attractive place to invest. The legal and regulatory changes mandated by WTO membership will help this process along. 

The important thing is that Ukraine has demonstrated that it wants to be a part of the global community, and is taking on reforms to get there. We will continue to support Ukraine in this endeavor.

By working on the three areas I just outlined-ensuring energy security, fighting corruption and building institutions, and enhancing open markets-Ukraine can achieve many if not most of its domestic and international goals.

Ukraine would help itself, for example, as it endeavors to join the EU. The U.S. and EU are very much in synch in our hopes that Ukraine will continue to build its young democracy while actively pursuing reforms.

The EU and the U.S. work together and coordinate our actions in support for Ukraine, and we value the extensive European contributions to Ukraine's development just as the Europeans value the strong and continued role played by the United States.

Some Europeans remain hesitant about committing to eventual EU membership for Ukraine. This is a choice that Europeans themselves must make and membership under any circumstances would likely be years away.

To be sure, we encourage the EU to recognize Ukraine's European choice and demonstrate that the door remains open to countries that meet EU accession standards. But we have told the Ukrainians that they could help their cause the most by accelerating reforms and taking steps to spur increased economic growth. Having a government in place would certainly help in that cause.

Ukraine can also help itself with its participation in the European Neighborhood Policy, which can be very helpful in encouraging such reforms.

The U.S. and the EU, for our part, can do more to support broader European energy security through efforts to help Ukraine fight corruption, become more energy efficient, and become a more reliable participant in energy markets and more market-oriented overall.

A reforming Ukraine can also help its relationship with NATO. NATO membership, by the way, is not a requirement for close relations with the U.S. It is up to Ukraine to determine what kind of relationship it wants with NATO. 

It was President Kuchma in 2002, in fact, who declared Ukraine's aspirations to join Euro-Atlantic institutions, including NATO. We remain very supportive of deeper ties between Ukraine and NATO, whether that would include membership or not. We would welcome a Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Ukraine, if that is the goal of a united Ukrainian government. We are actively engaged at NATO to help Ukraine achieve its reform and Euro-Atlantic goals. Necessary defense reform is proceeding well but needs to continue with or without a MAP.

It will be up to Ukraine's new government, of course, to demonstrate unity of purpose in furthering reform and in reaffirming Ukraine's interest in joining NATO. President Yushchenko's interest in deepening ties with NATO has been clear, but we need to see support for MAP across the government spectrum. The U.S. will not push Ukraine toward NATO; Ukraine must decide its relationship itself. 

One important priority is the pursuit of a credible, effective information campaign that dispels Soviet-era myths about NATO and realistically presents the benefits, obligations, and responsibilities of NATO membership to the people of Ukraine.

Surveys have demonstrated that domestic opposition to Ukraine's NATO membership is closely tied to a lack of information about NATO. Ignorance of NATO will not be resolved without a robust information campaign. Again, this will be up to the Ukrainians themselves; we can help but we cannot substitute for the work the government itself needs to engage in.

If the new Ukrainian government decides to pursue MAP and then eventually NATO membership, we will offer strong support and encouragement for as long as it takes. We are in this for the long haul. But Ukraine needs to make sure it has its act together before making premature appeals that will fall on deaf ears. NATO, after all, is a performance-based organization. A properly functioning government is obviously a basic prerequisite. 

NATO membership would be an important step toward Ukraine's integration into the Euro-Atlantic community and the door remains open. Membership is subject only to Ukraine's desire and its ability to meet NATO's performance-based standards and its commitment to the values shared by Alliance members. We remain committed to supporting Ukraine in reaching this goal. 

The free exchange of ideas between our two countries is critical to promoting understanding, and exchanges and academic programs are the best ways to do this. Nearly 700 Ukrainians came to the U.S. in 2006 to participate in professional and educational exchanges. These professional exchanges addressed issues such as community policing, municipal energy efficiency, and access for the disabled, government accountability, investment promotion and public health.

A reforming Ukraine can play an even larger role in advancing security in the Black Sea region. Ukraine plays a key role in the 5+2 negotiating process to resolve the conflict over the Transnistria region of Moldova. It has provided indispensable support to the EU's Border Monitoring Mission at the Ukrainian-Moldovan border. Ukraine's constructive approach to solving the Transnistria problem is a model for others.

Ukraine is also the largest member and an active participant in GUAM, bringing Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova together in practical forms of regional cooperation. In fact, GUAM's headquarters is based on Kyiv, thanks to Ukraine's hospitality and leadership in this organization. GUAM is an important regional organization that is taking on a life of its own, with its member states assuming greater responsibility for its collaborative efforts in law enforcement, border monitoring, security, and other common issues.

Most importantly, Ukraine can serve as a model for other countries transitioning to democracy in the region, showing that strong democracy and economic growth are complementary rather than contradictory. Some of Ukraine's neighbors could learn a few things about democratic development from Ukraine. 

The U.S. is committed to supporting Ukraine in its development from post-Soviet state to a prosperous, democratic, and sovereign state oriented to Europe and integrated into Euro-Atlantic institutions.

We are pleased that Europe is our partner in supporting democracy and reform in Ukraine. As we work together, it is important to keep in mind that the issue is not whether Ukraine is ready for NATO membership today, or whether it could be considered for EU membership now.

The issue is whether, with our support, Ukraine will undertake the tough reforms needed to build its democracy to meet high performance-based standards of both bodies, if that is the path they take.

If Ukraine succeeds in:

*	Ensuring energy security; 
*	Fighting corruption and building institutions; and 
*	Enhancing open markets. 

It will improve its chances of joining an international community that beckons and bring great benefit to its own people. Success at these reforms, inherently good in themselves, will bring real benefits to Ukraine.

We need to encourage and support them. But ultimately, it will be the decisions of the people of Ukraine, expressed through a democratic government, as well as a lot of hard work and a good deal of patience that will get them there.

Eurasia Daily Monitor 

Volume 4, Issue 233 December 17, 2007 -- Volume 4, Issue 233

RUSSIA, UKRAINE TRADE HARSH WORDS OVER HISTORICAL MEMORY

TARAS KUZIO

 

On December 14 Russia¹s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) issued a strongly worded statement complaining of ³open nationalist, anti-Russian, and Russphobic feelings and developments in Ukraine.² Attempts are being made, it claimed, to ³use difficult periods in our joint history to receive brief political rewards based on doubtful ideological pretensions.²

 

The number of historical issues dividing Ukraine and Russia continues to grow and aggravate the already strained relations between a reformist Ukraine and a resurgent, autocratic Russia. In late November both countries exchanged diplomatic notes after the Eurasian Youth Movement (EYM), a Russian nationalist group proscribed in Ukraine, destroyed an exhibition at the Ukrainian Embassy in Moscow marking the 1932­33 famine.

 

The Ukrainian side described the vandalism as ³provocative and anti-Ukrainian.² One month earlier the EYM had destroyed Ukrainian national symbols on Hoverla Mountain in western Ukraine and launched cyber attacks that shut down the presidential website. Since December 9 the servers supporting the orange youth NGO (www.maidan.org.ua), the Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group (www.khpg.org), and the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (www.helsinki.org.ua) have all faced sustained attacks.

 

Valentyn Nalyvaychenko, chairman of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), called upon his Russian counterparts to ³not permit on each other¹s territories extremist and, God forbid, terrorist actions, which are undertaken by such structures.² Reportedly officials foiled a terrorist attack that had been planned to coincide with a ³Russian march² in Crimea¹s capital Simferopol. The banned group Proryv, with underground branches in the Crimea and ties to extreme left and pan-Slavic groups, was suspected of being behind the planned provocation, which would have been blamed on ³Ukrainian nationalists.²

 

Ukraine and Russia have embraced differing interpretations of key historical events and personalities since the late Soviet era. The divergence continued under presidents Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma (1991-2004), with a return to Ukrainian national historiography, which had been banned in the 1930s but kept alive in the Ukrainian diaspora.

 

The process has become more heated with the rise of Ukraine¹s President Viktor Yushchenko and Russia¹s Vladimir Putin. Yushchenko has actively sought to investigate the ³blank pages² of Ukrainian history, while Putin has returned to a neo-Soviet synthesis of Russian imperial and Soviet ideology in historiography and national symbols.

 

Some of the most heated debates have occurred around two primary issues:

Ukrainian leaders and independence movements and crimes committed by the Soviet regime in Ukraine.

 

New Ukrainian symbols, holidays, and commemorations have prompted protests from Moscow. For example, the Tsarist and Soviet regimes regarded 18th century Cossack Hetman Ivan Mazepa to be a traitor, and the Russian Orthodox Church excommunicated him. But he is a hero in Ukraine. Mazepa¹s face appeared on Ukraine¹s currency in 1996, Kyiv¹s Sichnevo Povstannia street was renamed after him in October, and a new monument is planned. The Ecumenical Synod of the Russian (³Ukrainian²) Orthodox Church in Ukraine denounced the monument plans.

 

An October 9 decree outlined detailed instructions to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the Battle of Poltava, where a combined Swedish-Ukrainian force led by Mazepa lost to Russia. The 1709 battle is seen as a turning point that transformed Russia into an empire. Ukraine lost autonomy and was eventually absorbed into the Russian empire under Empress Catherine II. A monument unveiled to her in October in Odessa sparked violent clashes between Russian and Ukrainian nationalists.

 

A December 13 decree contained plans for commemorating the 90th anniversary of Ukraine¹s declaration of independence from the Tsarist Empire next year.

A monument to Symon Petliura, who led the drive for Ukrainian independence after the Russian Revolution, was vandalized in Poltava, his home region.

 

World War II also remains a divisive issue. A new monument to the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalist leader Stepan Bandera, assassinated by the KGB in Munich in 1959, was vandalized after it was recently unveiled in Lviv.

 

An October 12 presidential decree outlined instructions to local authorities about how to commemorate the 65th anniversary of the formation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), a nationalist guerrilla force that fought a decade-long war against Nazi and Soviet forces.

 

Another presidential decree awarded the ³Hero of Ukraine² designation to UPA commander Roman Shukhevych on the centennial of his birth. The decree noted Shukhevych¹s ³individual contribution to the national-liberation struggle for liberty and Ukrainian independence.² The Russian Foreign Ministry¹s December statement specifically complained that Pushkin Street in Lviv had been renamed after Shukhevych.

 

Kyiv¹s efforts to honor the victims of Soviet crimes have also irritated Moscow. While Yushchenko supported the opening of a new Museum of Soviet Occupation in Kyiv, the Russian MFA complained that Ukraine was attempting to ³nationalize² the suffering experienced by all Soviet peoples in the

1932-33 famine. The head of the Ukrainian MFA press service responded by advising his Russian colleagues that it was too late to discuss whether the famine was ³genocide,² as Ukraine had already taken this step. ³I would like to advise my Russian colleague,² he offered, that they should ³read historical books² and ³on this basis reach a conclusion.²

 

Russia¹s ambassador to Ukraine, Viktor Chernomyrdin, Foreign Ministry, and media have all condemned Ukraine¹s designation of Stalinist crimes and the famine as acts of genocide. The two sides have opposite views on Stalinism (see EDM, November 30) and Russia, as the legal successor to the USSR, is also concerned at possible future demands for compensation. In late November Ukrainian nationalist parties sent an open letter to the president and parliament demanding that Ukraine seek compensation from Russia through the European Court of Human Rights.

 

As the two countries move in separate directions, the individuals branded as traitors in Tsarist, Soviet, and post-communist Russia are increasingly becoming Ukraine¹s national heroes.

 

(Ukrayinska pravda, May 12, August 29, November 17, 20, 24, Kyiv Post, October 31, Novosti, March 15, president.gov.ua, mfa.gov.ua, mid.ru)

 

 

 

 

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