[Ohio UZO News] EDM; KP

[Deychak, Orest]

Eurasia Daily Monitor 
www.jamestown.org <www.jamestown.org> 
January 11, 2007
UKRAINE'S DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN PROSPECTS FOR 2007

Ukraine's domestic and foreign prospects in 2007 depend upon the resolution
of the political and constitutional crisis that began in 2006. Failure to
resolve this ongoing crisis will lead to stagnation and a possible retreat
from some of the gains of the Orange Revolution (see review of 2006 by Yulia
Tymoshenko in Zerkalo Tyzhnia, December 30, 2006).

This year will see the continuation of the Viktor Yanukovych government and
the anti-crisis parliamentary coalition. The coalition's Achilles heel is
the Socialist Party (SPU), which has little possibility of being elected to
the next parliament as long as it continues to remain in the coalition. The
Yanukovych government's first 150 days have been widely criticized inside
Ukraine for a lack of strategy, disinterest in reforms, no transparency, and
the return of discredited personnel from the Leonid Kuchma era.

This year will also see growing demands for the Constitutional Court to
reverse the infamous constitutional reforms, which transferred some
presidential powers to parliament. U.S. Judge Bohdan Futey, a long-time
adviser on legal reform in Ukraine, told Ukrayinska pravda (January 9) that
Ukraine's constitutional reforms could be considered "illegitimate." The
Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, which has consistently opposed the reforms, and Our
Ukraine will support their reversal.

The constitutional reforms could be abolished through a national referendum
this year, as the Constitutional Court mandated in a November 2006 ruling.
The Party of Regions has threatened to add two additional questions to any
referendum, such as supporting the elevation of Russian to a second state
language and on Ukraine's membership of NATO (Ukrayinska pravda, January 2,
4).

The Tymoshenko Bloc has been consistent in its demand for early
parliamentary elections, although leading deputy Mykola Tomenko is skeptical
that this will take place in 2007 (Ukrayinska pravda, January 1). Starting
this fall, the opposition will therefore begin to prepare for the October
2009 presidential elections. President Viktor Yushchenko will increasingly
be seen as a lame-duck president, and that the main election contest in 2009
will therefore be between Yanukovych and Tymoshenko.

This year will also see the growth of a united opposition to the anti-crisis
coalition that will build a protest movement similar to that which emerged
during the Kuchmagate crisis. Then and now, the main opposition force is the
Tymoshenko Bloc, with the difference being that it now has the
second-largest parliamentary faction.

The Tymoshenko Bloc has been strengthened by an alliance with the Reforms
and Order Party. The opposition coalition will be augmented by defectors
from Our Ukraine grouped around Mykola Katerynchuk's European Platform for
Ukraine and SPU defector Yuriy Lutsenko's Civil Movement for People's
Self-Defense (Ukrayinska pravda, January 2).

In the foreign policy domain, Ukraine's 2007 prospects look poor. The
domestic crisis and the failure to re-establish an Orange coalition
following the March 2006 parliamentary elections has led to a de facto
return of multi-vectorism in Ukraine's foreign policy (Ukrayinska pravda,
January 2). Multi-vectorism is a product of different foreign policy
orientations espoused by the president and prime minister. One anticipated
foreign policy success is Ukraine's entry into the WTO ahead of Russia,
which will give Kyiv added leverage in its trade and energy negotiations
with Moscow.

In addition, the EU has offered to begin negotiations with Ukraine on a free
trade area following its WTO membership. These negotiations will begin in
the second half of 2007, but they are unlikely to be concluded until the
first half of 2008. Ukraine will also negotiate a visa-free regime with the
EU.

This year will be the last of the ten-year Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Ukraine. An Enhanced Agreement and
European Neighborhood Policy-Plus (ENP+) will replace the PCA. However,
neither of these two formulations, like the PCA, offers future EU membership
for Ukraine.

These developments will strengthen the European vector in Ukraine's foreign
policy and, coupled with an increasingly more belligerent Russia, will make
the CIS Single Economic Space less attractive for Ukraine's elites.

The greatest disappointment in 2007 will be in Ukraine's relations with
NATO. Ukraine's opportunity of being invited into a Membership Action Plan
(MAP) at NATO's November 2006 Riga summit was squandered by the inability of
President Yushchenko and Our Ukraine to place national interests above
personal conflicts with Tymoshenko.

Ukraine's recent cooperation with NATO is at a higher level than that under
Kuchma, as Ukraine was invited in 2005 to join the Intensified Dialogue on
Membership. Nevertheless, Ukraine is continuing the Kuchma-era policy of
intensive cooperation with NATO while not seeking membership. NATO
membership will not return to the domestic agenda until the country's next
election cycle (in 2009-2011) is completed.

Intensive cooperation with NATO could be undermined if Defense Minister
Anatoliy Hrytsenko is removed, as the anti-crisis coalition has threatened
following its unconstitutional dismissal of Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk
in November 2006. Hrytsenko is the only Orange minister left in the
Yanukovych government, and his support for Ukraine's NATO membership is at
odds with that of the anti-crisis coalition and government.

--Taras Kuzio

 
Kyiv Post
January 11, 2007

Ukraine's constitutional crisis drags on

2007 will be a year of stagnation if Ukraine fails to cancel the political
reforms

Ukraine in 2007 will not move ahead if it cannot resolve its constitutional
crisis. As we have seen in 2006, the constitutional question influences
domestic politics (relations between parliament and the president),
economics (relations between the government and the president) and foreign
policy (as most glaringly seen in parliament's dismissal of the foreign
minister ) in Ukraine.

The answer as to what should be done over the constitutional crisis is a
complicated one that has many nuances.

In comparative perspective with other post-communist countries, Ukraine's
move from a semi-presidential to a parliamentary-presidential system is good
for its democratization. The 27 post-communist states can be readily divided
into parliamentary systems which have progressed in democratization and
presidential systems that have regressed into autocracy. 

The first group is based in central-eastern Europe and the Baltic states
-countries that have joined the EU and NATO. The second group is in the CIS,
most of whom have no intention of joining the EU or NATO.

A good argument could therefore be made that if a CIS state has a strategic
objective of joining the EU and NATO, then it should follow the path of
central-eastern Europe and reform its political system from a presidential
to a parliamentary one. Only three countries in the CIS desire to join the
EU - Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia - while only two seek to join NATO -
Ukraine and Georgia.

Moldova is the only CIS state with a full parliamentary system, where
parliament elects the president. Ukraine has a parliamentary-presidential
system with separate elections for parliament and the president. 

Following the Orange Revolution, Ukraine moved from a presidential to a
parliamentary system. Georgia, on the other hand, moved toward a
super-presidential system after its Rose Revolution, the opposite direction
to that undertaken in Ukraine. Although there have been some criticisms of
the autocratic style of President Mikhail Saakashvili, Georgia is
progressing better than Ukraine.

Although a move to parliamentarism in central-eastern Europe has proven to
be beneficial, the same may not be the case for Ukraine. Simply put, the
circumstances of countries in central-eastern Europe and those in the CIS
('path dependence' in political science jargon) are very different.
Georgia's path of presidential-led reforms may be more suited to CIS states.

Although some central-eastern Europe countries had autocratic leaders, such
as Vladimir Meciar in Slovakia and Franjo Tudjman in Croatia, they pale in
comparison to autocrats in Russia and the CIS. Meciar accepted the victory
of his democratic opponents in 1998, while Tudjman died in 1999, paving the
way for the victory of the opposition a year later. Although Tudjman was
guilty of some war crimes, these pale compared to the deaths of 100,000
people in Russia's brutal war in Chechnya.

Ukraine's Orange leaders therefore faced a far different opponent, the likes
of whom did not exist in central-eastern Europe or the Baltic states. In
Georgia the opposition remains weak and fractured within the New
Rights-Industrialists and Democratic Front factions in parliament. There is
no possibility of a return to power by political forces loyal to former
President Eduard Shevardnadze or his autocratic Ajarian ally Ruslan
Abashidze. The opposition in Ukraine was initially dispirited, but rebounded
to win the 2006 elections. 

The Rose Revolution coalition continues to be united. In fact, the two main
parties in the National Movement-Democratic Front (EM-DP) united into the
United National Movement. Contrast this with the split in the Orange camp
only nine months into the administration of President Viktor Yushchenko.
Only the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko remains true to the Orange ideals.
Yushchenko betrayed them in September 2005, and after the 2006 elections,
when he negotiated with the Party of Regions and the Socialists, betrayed
them in July 2006, when the Socialists defected to the Anti-Crisis
coalition.

A major difference between Georgia and Ukraine has also been in the type of
leader who came to power. In effect, the radical wing of the Georgian Rose
Revolution won the presidency; in other words, the equivalent of Yulia
Tymoshenko winning in Ukraine. 

The Tymoshenko Bloc has been consistently against constitutional reforms and
voted against them in December 2004. Our Ukraine's stance, on the other
hand, has been contradictory and opportunistic: In December 2004, they voted
in favor of them and today they call for the abolition of constitutional
reforms. 

If Ukraine's 'Saakashvili' (i.e. Tymoshenko) had been elected president in
2004, there would be fewer demands today for the abolishment of
constitutional reforms. Unlike Yushchenko, Tymoshenko would find sufficient
political will, self-confidence and ability to exercise power to be a
successful counterweight to Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych.

Saakashvili's performance in Georgia shows three factors absent in Ukraine.
First, it brought to power a highly motivated and, in the words of Georgia's
leading analyst Ghia Nodia, "impatient" group of younger politicians. Nodia
points to Saakashvili's "massive energy" in pushing forward reforms. Similar
energy has been absent from the Yushchenko administration.

Second, Saakashvili defines himself in opposition to his predecessor
Shevardnadze, whom he constantly criticizes. In Ukraine, former President
Leonid Kuchma is only a negative 'other' for Tymoshenko, but not for
Yushchenko, who has never once criticized Kuchma after he was elected.
Orange voters expected at the minimum a moral denunciation of the Kuchma
regime, or at a maximum his trial for abuse of office. They received neither
and have as a consequence defected en masse to Tymoshenko.

Third, Saakashvili has self-confidence in his policies and actions both
domestically and abroad. The same is not true of Yushchenko, particularly in
the energy sector. Even Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka seems
more determined to stand up for his country's national interests in his
dealings with Russia than Yushchenko did in the January 2006 gas crisis.

Constitutional reforms have proven to be flawed for a host of reasons
outlined above. They were rushed through parliament in the Dec. 8, 2004
'packet' without widespread public discussion, national referendum or
removal of its weaknesses. 

The Constitutional Court has every ground to consider constitutional reforms
"illegal," according to U.S. Judge Bohdan Futey, a longtime adviser to
Ukraine on legal questions. Without this step, 2007 will be one of
stagnation for Ukraine that could lead to the gains of the Orange Revolution
being slowly removed. 

Dr. Taras Kuzio is president of the consulting company, Kuzio Associates,
and an adjunct professor at the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian
Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington
University.  

Eurasia Daily Monitor

January 10, 2007 -- Volume 4, Issue 7
YUSHCHENKO FACES NATO REFERENDUM PROBLEM
   
Signatures have been collected in Ukraine in favor of holding a referendum
on membership in NATO and the Single Economic Space -- a loose economic
union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The Central Electoral Commission
(CEC) has confirmed that the signatures are valid. Pro-Western President
Viktor Yushchenko is against the referendum, however, because the answer on
NATO will most probably be no, as NATO is unpopular in Ukraine. What
initially looked like a hopeless campaign by political outsiders may badly
affect the country's NATO membership prospect. The SES membership issue is
not as controversial, as apparently neither Yushchenko nor Prime Minister
Viktor Yanukovych is against it in principle.
   
The signature collection campaign was launched by the Social Democratic
Party-United (SDPUo) of Viktor Medvedchuk, a former key aide to former
president Leonid Kuchma, in October 2005. The SDPUo, along with the
Communists (CPU), used the issue in the run-up to the April 2006
parliamentary election to capitalize on the pro-Russian sentiment in eastern
and southern Ukraine. This did not help them much, as the SDPUo lost the
election, and the CPU got only 20 seats in the 450-strong parliament. In any
case, the organizers submitted to the CEC in March 2006 far more than the
three million signatures legally required for a referendum.
   
At least 200,000 signatures were falsified, and 28 related criminal cases
were launched, according to CEC chief Yaroslav Dadydovych. Nevertheless, on
December 29 the CEC officially approved the validity of more than four
million signatures. Davydovych told a press conference that the commission
has done what it legally was obliged to do, and now it is up to Yushchenko
to sign the relevant decree to schedule the vote. Yushchenko's secretariat
has not concealed its skepticism. The secretariat will check the
authenticity of the signatures once again, Yushchenko's press secretary
Iryna Vannykova announced on December 30.
   
Yanukovych was less doubtful. "A state body not subordinated to any branch
of power [i.e. the CEC] has delivered its verdict, which we have to abide
by," the press service of Yanukovych's Party of Regions quoted him as
saying. Yanukovych noted that this is probably not the best time for a
referendum on NATO and the SES, but "if we live according to laws of a
democratic society, we have to respect and fully abide by democratic
principles, irrespective of the context or individuals involved." The CPU,
predictably, welcomed the development. CPU leader Petro Symonenko urged
parliament on January 9 to do all it can to compel Yushchenko to call a
referendum.
   
Segodnya, a newspaper critical of Yushchenko, has quoted analyst Volodymyr
Malynkovych as saying that, according to the constitution, Yushchenko will
have to call a referendum. But Yushchenko may delay this for as long as he
wants, as no law compels him to make a decision immediately, Malynkovych
noted. Another expert quoted by Segodnya, former parliament deputy speaker
Viktor Musiyaka, pointed to a discrepancy between the constitution and the
1991 law on referenda, which obliges parliament's presidium -- a body
scrapped more than a decade ago -- rather than the president to set the date
for a referendum.
   
Analyst Volodymyr Fesenko told Segodnya that neither Yushchenko nor
Yanukovych are interested in a referendum on NATO and the SES. He suggested,
however, that Yanukovych might push for such a referendum if Yushchenko
insists on a referendum to reverse constitutional reform. This means that
Yanukovych and the majority in parliament, which supports him, may use the
NATO and SES referendum threat as a tool to thwart Yushchenko's plan to
reverse the constitutional amendments that significantly weakened the
president vis-à-vis parliament (see EDM, November 29, 2006).
   
Popular support for NATO membership has been hovering around 20% during the
past six years or so, according to various opinion polls, so the negative
result of a referendum is easy to predict. Another referendum on the same
issue may be held only after five years, according to the law on referenda.
The same law leaves to parliament the option to override referendum results
by a two-thirds vote. Yushchenko's Our Ukraine bloc, which is the only
consistently pro-NATO force in parliament, is very far from controlling
two-thirds, even if it secures support of the opposition Yulia Tymoshenko
Bloc. This means that a referendum on NATO could put off Ukraine's
membership bid until at least 2011, when the next parliamentary election is
due to be held. It will also strengthen doubts in the West about the
seriousness of Ukraine's NATO choice.
   
The Declaration of National Unity that both Yushchenko and Yanukovych signed
in August 2006 stipulates that a referendum should be held as the last stage
of the NATO accession process. The Declaration is more ambiguous on the SES,
containing no referendum requirement, linking Ukraine's membership of SES to
World Trade Organization rules and urging a free-trade zone as the
prerequisite for full participation in the SES. Opinion polls show that more
than half of Ukrainians support SES membership for the country.  
   
(Channel 5, December 29, 30, January 9; Segodnya, January 3; ProUA.com,
January 4)

--Pavel Korduban


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