[Ohio UZO News] KP; Bloomberg, OSCE; Note

[Deychak, Orest]

Kyiv Post

http://www.kyivpost.com/

 

Opinion > Op-Ed  


Strategy and tactics of Euro-Atlantic integration


Jan 09 2008

Ukraine can join both NATO and the EU if the country follows four
pro-active steps

By TARAS KUZIO, HRYHORIY PEREPYLYTSYA and WALTER ZARYCKYJ 

Ukraine's path to Trans-Atlantic and European integration has not been
as rapid as envisaged following the Orange Revolution. After the Sept.
2007 parliamentary elections an orange coalition was established with a
government headed by Yulia Tymoshenko. If an orange coalition and orange
president can maintain political unity for the short term (until the
2009 presidential elections) and medium term (until the next
parliamentary elections in 2012) the next five years could constitute an
important breakthrough in Ukraine's domestic and foreign policy,
including its integration into the full range of Trans-Atlantic and
European structures.

Ukraine's Relations with NATO

In April 2008 at NATO's Bucharest summit, three Western Balkan states -
Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia - will be invited to join NATO. All
three have had Membership Action Plans (MAPs) since 1999-2002. The only
remaining former Yugoslav state still seeking NATO membership is
possibly Montenegro which may receive an invitation to join a MAP at the
2008 summit. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia are disinterested in NATO
membership.

In NATO's decade-long enlargement process its major test will be to
enlarge the organization into the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS). Although four countries belong to the GUAM regional organization
(comprised of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) only two of them
- Georgia and Ukraine - seek to join NATO. Until the autumn 2007
political crisis in Georgia it was assumed that the country was on
target to receive a MAP at the 2008 NATO summit. 

Georgia and Ukraine had always been treated as one group by the US and
NATO for NATO membership prospects. But, three factors have worked
towards the group dividing and Georgia had moved ahead of Ukraine.
Firstly, support for NATO membership in Georgia is 61 percent (according
to a January referendum) and has broad political support within the
ruling authorities and the opposition. In Ukraine's parliament only the
two orange forces support NATO membership (although the Tymoshenko
government may not support a presidential request to seek a MAP in
Bucharest). Another three political forces are either against
(Communists) or ambivalent (Lytvyn bloc and the Party of Regions).
Secondly, Ukraine has devoted the majority of its energy since the
Orange Revolution to defusing domestic crises, implementing
constitutional reforms and holding two elections, leading to the failure
to grasp an opportunity to enter MAP at the Nov. 2006 Riga summit.
Thirdly, Georgia's security situation vis-a-vis Russia is more
precarious than that of Ukraine.

Georgia's autumn 2007 crisis may be bad for Georgia, as it may postpone
its entrance into a MAP, but this could prove to be fortuitous for
Ukraine. Georgia's failure to enter a MAP in 2008 will give Ukraine a
second chance to re-join the NATO membership queue together with Georgia
(rather than alone). Both countries could strive for a MAP in 2009-2010,
after the Ukrainian presidential elections (assuming an orange candidate
won), followed by NATO membership in 2010-2012 before, or after, the
next parliamentary elections. 

Ukraine's advantage over Georgia is that it has fulfilled yearly Action
Plans with NATO since 2003. Introduced at the 2002 Prague NATO summit
these Action Plans are unique to Ukraine. As the Action Plans cover
military, security and political-economic issues, a Ukraine-NATO Action
Plan could, without too much effort, be converted into a Ukraine-NATO
Membership Action Plan. The first Viktor Yanukovych government
implemented the first two Action Plans in 2003-2004. 

The addition of the word "Membership" to "Action Plan" would be
significant in showing that Ukraine was moving towards membership.
Former US Ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer said, "We told Ukrainian
officials in early 2003 that the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan agreed at the
November 2002 Prague summit was 90-95 percent of a MAP. The main
difference was in the title."

The length of time that countries experience in MAPs is different for
each state and dependent on the range of reforms that need to be
undertaken. If Ukraine were to join a MAP in 2009-2010 (together with
Georgia) this would mean that it had already fulfilled seven yearly
Action Plans prior to this. Ukraine's length of time spent in a MAP
could be therefore short as the majority of the required reforms would
have already been undertaken in Action Plans since 2003.

A referendum on NATO membership is only undertaken on one occasion and
usually on the eve of achieving membership. Only 51 percent is required
to endorse the referendum. Until the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and
anti-American campaigns launched by the authorities in the 2002 and 2004
elections, support for NATO membership was backed by one third of
Ukrainians, with one third against and another third undecided. If this
balance of public opinion was to be again reached (for example,
following the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq under a new US President
in 2009) then a 50 percent plus majority could be obtained. A vigorous
information campaign would need to be undertaken from now and throughout
the MAP.

Ukraine's Relations with the EU

Ukraine's relations with the EU are very different to those of NATO.
Whereas NATO has always held an open door to Ukraine's potential
membership the EU has undertaken double standards and lack of strategic
vision. Nevertheless, NATO membership has traditionally been a stepping
stone to EU membership for all post-communist states. Ukraine cannot
follow the path of EU neutral members Ireland, Austria, Sweden and
Finland who do not desire NATO membership.

The countries of the CIS were never slated for EU membership after the
collapse of communism and membership was only offered to central-eastern
European countries and the Baltic states. Within this group of
countries, the slower reformers did not perform much better than
Ukraine. Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria had similar difficulties in
their post-communist transitions of slow reform, entrenched
post-communist elites, corruption and weak democratic reformers. The
advantage these three countries had was that the EU offered them
membership which encouraged reform.

All central-eastern European countries and the Baltic States had to
prove their commitment to fulfilling the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria
adopted by the EU. By 1999-2000, when the EU began membership talks,
Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria had not made sufficient progress in
reform to warrant such a step. Nevertheless, the EU went ahead and gave
membership to Slovakia in 2004 and Romania and Bulgaria in 2007. 

A second case of double standards was the offer made in 1999-2000 to the
Western Balkan states of Stabilization and Accession Agreements (SAA)
that held out the prospect of future membership. None of these countries
had proven their commitment to reform in the 1990s and the SAA's were a
purely political and geopolitical strategy by the EU to prevent a return
to ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Macedonia was offered
candidate status by the EU in 2001 as an inducement to end its civil
war. 

Today, Ukraine is as advanced in its reforms as these slow reformers in
central-eastern Europe and the western Balkans but it continues to be
denied membership prospects by the EU. Ukraine has either been denied
membership by the EU because it was seen as outside "Europe" (by being
in the Eurasian CIS and closely linked to Russia), a view commonly held
in Western Europe in the 1990s, or because it had peacefully resolved
its ethnic problems and did not experience a civil war (unlike the
former Yugoslavia). Ukraine was in effect being 'punished' for joining
the CIS in 1991 (unlike the three Baltic States) and not having had a
civil war (unlike the Western Balkans).

Ukraine was therefore offered in Feb. 2005 the rather demeaning
membership of the European Neighborhood Plan (ENP) with a three year
Action Plan. Ukraine would have received the ENP Action Plan regardless
of whether Viktor Yanukovych or Yushchenko had won the 2004 elections.
The EU largely ignored the Orange Revolution.

The geographic distribution of ENP members reflects the fact that that
the EU's policy towards Ukraine is ill thought out. ENP members include
non-European states in Northern Africa and the Middle East as well as
three European countries: Ukraine, Moldova and  - since 2007 - Belarus.
The ENP does not include the Western Balkans (with Stabilization and
Accession Agreements) or Turkey (a candidate member since 2005) while
Russia has excluded itself preferring to conduct a bilateral
relationship with the EU. Turkey began membership negotiations in 2005
despite strong opposition to its membership in Western Europe; France
and Austria will hold referendums on future EU members. In France
support for Ukraine's membership of the EU is far higher than for Turkey
and President Nicolas Sarkozy has a good relationship with Premier
Tymoshenko.

In 2008 Ukraine will enter the WTO and the ten year Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) will have reached its finale. What should
Ukraine seek to replace the PCA? 

The EU has offered to negotiate a Free Trade Area with Ukraine following
its entrance into the WTO. Beyond this, Ukraine should no longer
participate in the ENP, an organization where the bulk of its members
are not within geographic Europe. Ukraine's continued membership in the
ENP should be premised on a status different to ENP members who are not
in Europe and therefore have no legal right under the 1957 Rome Treaty
to join the EU. 

Such an ENP status, which has been termed "privileged partnership",
should offer Ukraine the prospect of membership. The European Parliament
has issued 4 resolutions in support of Ukrainian membership since the
Orange Revolution. It is time for the EU to stop adopting double
standards to Ukraine and give it the same prospects for membership
offered to slow reformers in central-eastern Europe, such as Romania,
the Western Balkans and Turkey. 

Towards a European Strategy 

Ukraine has a strong possibility of completing its integration into
Trans-Atlantic and European structures within the next decade. In the
short term the following steps need to be taken:

1. Coordinate a MAP and NATO membership with Georgia bilaterally and
through GUAM and the US. 

2. Ukraine should have a large delegation of policy advisers, government
and presidential officials, parliamentary deputies, journalists and NGO
leaders at the April 2008 NATO Bucharest summit. There should not be a
repeat of the Nov. 2006 Riga NATO summit attended by only three
Ukrainians (including only one official).

3. The Ukraine-NATO Committee NGO, to be officially launched by
ourselves in Jan. 2008 with members drawn from Ukraine, Europe and North
America, is open to membership by all NGO's and individuals who support
Ukraine's Trans-Atlantic aspirations. The Ukraine-NATO Committee will
lobby for Ukraine's NATO membership and coordinate the work of a
disparate group of NGO's, practitioners and journalists who support its
aims and objectives. 

4. Ukraine's presidential, government and parliamentary elites have the
opportunity to establish a cross-party and cross-regional consensus in
support of a Ukrainian position towards the EU. Both the orange
coalition and parliamentary opposition would be able to agree on a
common negotiating position towards the EU that is commensurate with
Ukraine's strategic importance and its progress in democratic and
economic reforms. Since 2005, Ukraine is the only CIS country defined as
'Free' by the New York-based think tank Freedom House. Ukraine has every
right to be treated in the same manner as Romania, Bulgaria, the Western
Balkans and Turkey and Ukraine should not join any ENP or Privileged
Partnership if there is no prospect of future membership of the EU.
Ukraine has every right to demand to be treated in the same manner as
the Western Balkan states whose Stabilization and Accession Agreements
hold out future membership prospects. Failure to do so would constitute
punishment for Ukraine having resolved its regional and ethnic conflicts
in a peaceful manner.

Dr. Taras Kuzio is a Research Associate, Institute for European, Russian
and Eurasian Studies, Elliott School of International Affairs, George
Washington University; Professor Hryhoriy Perepylytsya is Director,
Foreign Policy Research Institute, Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine;
Professor Walter Zaryckyj of New York University and Executive Director
of the Center for US-Ukrainian Relations.

 

Bloomberg 

Ukraine Irks Russia With Push to Mark Stalin Famine as Genocide 

By Daryna Krasnolutska and Halia Pavliva

 

  <http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=photos&sid=akRdu1cuBPKg> 

Jan. 4 (Bloomberg) -- Maksym Kravets remembers watching hunger kill his
father, then his mother. 

Kravets, who was 14 when famine struck Ukraine in 1932, says he survived
by eating a dog. About a third of the 1,000 people in his village,
Lozova, perished as Soviet leader Josef Stalin cut off food supplies to
force peasants onto collective farms. 

``A special group of people was in the village taking away all the food
we had,'' says Kravets, now 89, sitting in his kitchen in
Kamyanets-Podilsky, 300 kilometers (186 miles) from where he almost
starved to death. ``There were cases when people ate their dead children
and parents.'' 

The yearlong famine, which killed at least 7 million people, is now the
focus of books, exhibitions and documentaries marking the 75th
anniversary. Ukraine's government is asking the United Nations to
recognize the disaster as an act of genocide, worsening already frosty
relations with Russia, which says the famine resulted from drought. 

Russian nationalists vandalized an exhibit at the Ukrainian embassy in
Moscow in November. While the Russian government didn't condone the
attack, it called Ukraine's depiction of the famine a ``one-sided
falsification of history.'' 

``It's completely impossible to treat it as genocide,'' says Dmitry
Peskov, spokesman for Russian President Vladimir Putin. ``What happened
there happened not only in Ukraine but in many parts of the former
Soviet Union.'' 

State of Denial 

Ukraine's famine was kept out of official history until 1991, when the
country of 47 million won independence. It is recognized as genocide by
countries including the U.S. 

``Russian society is, broadly speaking, still in a state of denial about
the crimes of the communist past,'' says Robin Shepherd, a senior
research fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs at
Chatham House in London. Putin and his government see the drive to label
the famine genocide as ``an insult to Russian pride.'' 

Ukraine didn't do much to put the famine on the historical map until the
pro-European Union President Viktor Yushchenko took power in the 2004
Orange Revolution. Ukraine commemorated the victims for the first time
two years ago. 

Yushchenko now plans to make it an offence to deny the famine was an act
of genocide. Violators would be subject to as much as two years in jail
and a fine of 5,100 hryvnia ($1,020). The move would mirror Germany,
where it's a crime to deny the Holocaust. 

Political Battle 

Communist Party leader Petro Simonenko says Yuschenko is ``stirring up
hatred'' as Ukrainian and ethnic Russian politicians battle for control
of the government. 

Putin openly supported the pro-Russian candidate in the 2004
presidential election before the result was overturned as rigged by a
Ukrainian court. Russia is opposed to the policies of the Orange
coalition now in government, which is seeking closer ties to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization and the EU. 

The anniversary events started Nov. 24, when thousands of people
gathered in Kiev and on the main squares of other cities. 

``The main killer was the totalitarian communist regime,'' Yushchenko
told the crowd in the capital. ``Fear is at the root of today's
political and social problems.'' 

In 1929, Stalin decreed that all agricultural workers had to join
collective farms, bringing with them their livestock and tools. They
were to plant and harvest together, so that the state could ship food to
industrial areas. Some farmers resisted leaving their land, and many
were sent to labor camps. Those who remained risked death from
starvation. 

Grain Seized 

Across the Soviet Union, more than 10 million people died from hunger
during the collectivization drive, according to research by historian
Robert Conquest. The majority of the deaths were in Ukraine, the second
most populous republic in the Soviet Union and the largest grain
producer after Russia. 

Stalin wrote in August 1932 to one of his politburo members expressing
concern that Ukraine wasn't complying and must be forced into
submission. ``If we don't fix the situation in Ukraine immediately, we
may lose Ukraine,'' he wrote. The letter was published by Russia's
Nezavisimaya Gazeta in 2000. 

While the harvest was poor because of drought, as much as half of the
grain was shipped out, says Vasyl Marochko, head of the Center for
Ukrainian Genocide Studies in Kiev. 

``The 1932 harvest was swept away completely,'' says Halyna Mendzyak,
who was 9 and lived in Mynkivtsi, western Ukraine. ``When they put it in
rail wagons, an orchestra was playing with slogans like `Let's give all
grain to our state!''' 

Kravets says peasants in his area refused five orders to collectivize
their farms in the years before the famine began. His parents finally
went to work on a state farm in 1932, leaving him alone in their house. 

When two aunts came to his parents' home to check for survivors, they
found only his emaciated body. Kravets recalls hearing them say he
wouldn't last the night before they walked away, leaving the door ajar. 

``A dog then entered and started to lick me, so I got up very slowly,
tied him to a bed with a towel and then took an axe and killed him,'' he
says. ``I still can't understand where I got the energy. I was eating
that dog for several days.'' 

 

OSCE

UKRAINE  

PRE-TERM PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 

30 September 2007  

OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Report

FINAL REPORT

20 December, 2007

http://www.osce.org/documents/html/pdftohtml/29054_en.pdf.html

 

NOTE:

If you wish to receive a soft-cover copy of the Helsinki Commission
April 25, 2006 Chornobyl hearing which included as witnesses Ukraine's
Ambassador to the U.S. Oleh Shamshur, State Department official Steve
Rademaker, and Prof. David Marples, please respond to me with the
address to which you would like it sent.  A limited number of copies are
available, so only one per customer, please.  They are free of charge.

Also, the hearing can be downloaded by going to the Commission's
website:  www.csce.gov <http://www.csce.gov/> .  Click on the map of
Ukraine to view this hearing and other Commission Ukraine-related
initiatives. 

OD

 

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