[Ohio UZO News] AP; KP; EDM (2); RFE/RL; Charter 97

[Deychak, Orest]

(Note:  Dear Friends and Colleagues:  The next mail-out to this list will not be until after the U.S. Memorial Day weekend, as I will be in Georgia next week to observe their parliamentary elections.  Regards, Orest) 

Associated Press

Ukraine WTO; Ukraine joins WTO, forcing economic reforms and opening new trade channels 

By OLGA BONDARUK 

Associated Press Writer

16 May 2008

KIEV, Ukraine (AP) - Ukraine became the 152nd country to join the World Trade Organization on Friday after 14 years of negotiations, getting in ahead of bigger neighbor Russia and committing the former Soviet republic to economic reforms and opening new trade channels.

Experts expect new economic ties to boost chiefly agricultural, chemical and metals exports.

A membership protocol ratified by parliament last month officially came into effect Friday, according to a statement from President Viktor Yushchenko's office.

Over the 14 years of accession negotiations, Ukraine implemented a range of economic reforms and amended more than 50 laws to bring the country into line with WTO norms. Membership obliges Kiev to further reforms.

Russia, its main trade partner, is the only major economy yet to join. Ukraine will have veto power over Russian accession but may be eager to see Moscow bound by the same trade rules amid political tension.

Many believe Russia's inclusion in the trade club would be beneficial to Ukraine because it would prevent Moscow from applying tariffs that are against WTO rules.

Key Ukrainian exports to Russia include spirits, oil, sugar and various raw materials.

Yushchenko has promised that Ukraine would not unfairly use its new position inside the WTO to damage Russia's 15-year accession bid.

"I would warn of an aggravation of relations" if Ukraine were to block Russia's entry, said Kostantyn Kuznetsov, an economic analyst at the Kiev-based Razumkov think tank. "That would be "wrong ... and a way that leads nowhere."

Ukraine was formally invited to join the global trading community on Feb. 5.

Kyiv Post


Orange forces face embarrassment


by Zenon Zawada, Kyiv Post Chief Editor
May 15 2008

The mayoral election campaign has further damaged the Orange forces¡¯ credibility.

Unless a last-minute political breakthrough is reached by Ukraine¡¯s pro-Western forces, led by the Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, they are on the cusp of suffering a humiliating defeat in the May 25 election for Kyiv¡¯s mayor.

It¡¯s embarrassing enough when the parliamentary coalition's biggest faction, the Tymoshenko Bloc, not only blocks the presidium it itself controls, as it did on May 13, but also obstructs President Viktor Yushchenko from delivering an address.

Mind you, he¡¯s the leader of the ¡°Democratic Forces Coalition¡¯s¡± other faction, and an ally from that Orange Revolution that seems so long ago.

¡°An unprecedented event happened today, when the parliamentary majority, responsible for the Ukrainian parliament¡¯s work, began blocking it,¡± a visibly stunned Yushchenko said afterwards.

What will be more embarrassing is oncoming mayoral election debacle. It was the Tymoshenko-led pro-Western forces themselves which voted to call the pre-term mayoral election in the first place, in order to unseat Leonid Chernovetskiy, who stands accused, but not convicted, of rampant corruption during his two years as Kyiv¡¯s mayor.

Regardless, Chernovetskiy is on his way to victory, and the lack of unity among Ukraine¡¯s pro-Western forces is to blame. President Viktor Yushchenko is engaged in an all-out war with Tymoshenko, who is threatening their second divorce.

In one of the dozen or so battles in this war, Yushchenko has threatened to veto any legislation creating a second round in the May 25 election, which would significantly boost the odds of Chernovetskiy¡¯s defeat. 

At present, three contenders are splitting the anti-Chernovetskiy vote among themselves, including boxing champion Vitali Klitschko, essentially paving the way to victory for the incumbent.

That Ukraine¡¯s top two pro-Western politicians and their respective forces can¡¯t unite at least on the goal of ousting Kyiv¡¯s allegedly corrupt mayor is a sad reflection on just how much of the Orange Revolution¡¯s promise was squandered.

After coming to power in January 2005, Ukraine¡¯s pro-Western politicians had a chance to prove they¡¯re a cut above the rest of Ukraine¡¯s politicians. Rather than seizing the opportunity to harness the once-in-a-lifetime public support to implement sweeping reform in governance, the courts and education, the Orange leaders let it slip through their fingers as they pulled each other by the hair (or braids).

As a direct result, the Ukrainian electorate isn¡¯t much interested in what Yushchenko has to say anymore. 

He would gain about 8 percent of the vote in a presidential election at this point, according to polls.

While Yushchenko¡¯s party, Our Ukraine People¡¯s Union, can¡¯t field a mayoral candidate and is doubtful to qualify for the Kyiv City Council, the Tymoshenko Bloc¡¯s candidate for the mayoral post, Oleksandr Turchynov, has only about 7 percent support.

That¡¯s because the Tymoshenko Bloc¡¯s huge success so far is largely based on Tymoshenko¡¯s personality and charisma, and not any concrete political platform or specific principles the bloc represents. 

As evidence, after a few weeks of campaigning, the Tymoshenko Bloc decided it needed to depict Tymoshenko¡¯s radiant visage alongside Turchynov¡¯s image on all campaign advertising.

It¡¯s no secret many Tymoshenko Bloc politicians are mostly opportunists, who also served former President Leonid Kuchma. 

Meanwhile, the Novynar magazine revealed Tymoshenko has established pragmatic relations with Viktor Medvedchuk, a close friend to Russian leaders Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev. In spite of such associations, Tymoshenko somehow remains untainted in the eyes of her electorate.

Ukrainian political observers conceded these elections would be a useful barometer to predict the next presidential election, likely to occur in early 2010, five years after Yushchenko¡¯s inauguration in January 2005.

Three basic conclusions can already be drawn.  

1. More than three years after the Orange Revolution, Ukraine¡¯s pro-Western forces have failed to convince a definitive majority of Ukrainians they offer a better vision for the nation. Chernovetskiy, the ultimate pragmatist with few political principles, has mustered far more support among Kyiv residents than any of the other pro-Western candidates competing. Meanwhile, polls reveal the Russian-oriented Party of the Regions of Ukraine, and Viktor Yanukovych, remain just as popular as the Tymoshenko Bloc.

2. The mayoral election campaign has further damaged the Orange forces¡¯ credibility. In supporting Chernovetskiy, a politician reviled by Kyiv¡¯s intellectuals and middle class, by threatening to veto a second round, Yushchenko has once again demonstrated, barring any breakthroughs, that he is more interested in keeping power and manipulating the levers of government than unseating an incumbent widely accused of corruption, particularly in allegedly misappropriating government funds and improperly re-distributing thousands of hectares of land, allegedly worth hundreds of millions of dollars, as political tribute. Meanwhile, Tymoshenko could suffer her first big defeat that threatens to be the first major blow to her popularity.

3. Ukraine¡¯s pro-Western forces face their biggest crisis yet. Revealing their hubris in hastily launching pre-term elections, their failure will only reinforce Chernovetskiy¡¯s grip on the Kyiv City Administration and bolster his authority. While that may serve Yushchenko¡¯s short-term goals as president, it doesn¡¯t help his Our Ukraine-People¡¯s Self-Defense bloc, which is likely to collapse after he likely loses the presidential election of 2010. In fact, both of Ukraine¡¯s leading pro-Western forces, the Tymoshenko and Our Ukraine-People¡¯s Self-Defense blocs, hinge entirely on their leaders ¨C Tymoshenko and Yushchenko. Either bloc would disintegrate if either personality failed in politics.

How tragic it is that two forces so dependent on each other are causing each other¡¯s demise. 

And the Russians didn¡¯t even need to lift a finger!

Zenon Zawada is chief editor of the Kyiv Post.

 

Eurasia Daily Monitor 
 
May 15, 2008 -- Volume 5, Issue 93             
                 
YUSHCHENKO WILL BE MARGINALIZED BY CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN UKRAINE
                     
The three holiday breaks (Easter, May Day and World War II Victory Day) gave only a short respite before the two main figures in Ukrainian politics, President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, resumed their fight to the bitter end. Yushchenko and Tymoshenko are ostensibly members of the same democratic (i.e. ¡°Orange¡±) coalition established after the September 2007 pre-term elections. The conflict within the ¡°Orange¡± camp was evident on May 13, when the Tymoshenko bloc blockaded parliament to protest what it described as ¡°sabotage¡± of government policies. It prevented the president from giving his annual address, which was unprecedented in Ukraine's 17 years of independence.

The center of the conflict is the head of the presidential secretariat Viktor Baloha, little known until the 2002 elections except in his home border region of Trans-Carpathia. The majority of Western embassies, a large share of Ukrainian politicians (even from Our Ukraine-Peoples Self Defense [NU-NS] and the opposition Party of Regions), think tanks, journalists and the public are united in their view that Baloha¡¯s strident antagonism to Tymoshenko does more harm than good to the president and to the NU-NS, of which Baloha is honorary chairman. Most observers of Ukrainian politics cannot understand how the president can let his chief of staff make daily denunciations and demands to its government, without a moral or constitutional basis on which to do so. Yushchenko appears oblivious to the negative effect this has on his own and the NU-NS¡¯s ratings.

A May poll found that for the first time the hero of the Orange Revolution had higher negative approval ratings than positive. Only 13 percent trust Yushchenko, while 26.5 percent distrust him (the respective figures are 30 and 26 percent for Tymoshenko and 24 and 26 percent for Viktor Yanukovych). The same poll found that the Tymoshenko bloc (BYuT) continues to have greater support (25 percent) than the Party of Regions (23 percent) with NU-NS support collapsing from 14 percent in the 2007 elections to 5.4 percent (See EDM March 20).

In a May 6 statement Baloha continued to lambaste the government¡¯s policies. The major bone of contention remains privatization, but the roles have been reversed since the 2005 Tymoshenko government.

As Yushchenko and Baloha repeatedly stress, they do not agree that a portion of the proceeds from privatization should continue going toward the repayment of lost or stolen Soviet bank savings, the first tranche of which was paid in January. Baloha complained that the costs from the privatization of the Odessa Port Terminal, which the president is repeatedly attempting to halt, should go toward economic growth and societal needs and not for a ¡°one-off PR ploy¡± for Tymoshenko.

The repayment of Soviet era savings lost in Russia¡¯s nationalization of Soviet banking assets in 1991 and Ukraine¡¯s 1993 hyperinflation has become hostage to the January 2010 presidential elections. President Yushchenko is threatened by Tymoshenko¡¯s high ratings, one reason for which is the popularity she has gained from fulfilling her 2007 electoral pledge to repay the lost savings.

The repeated non-fulfillment of election promises has had a negative impact on both Yushchenko¡¯s and the NU-NS¡¯s ratings. Yushchenko¡¯s 2004 election program supported the government¡¯s repayment of savings. If elected, Yushchenko promised to ¡°make the oligarchs really pay all their taxes. I am against a re-division of property, but oligarchs will be made to pay a real price for the enterprises that they have grabbed during privatization (prykhvatizatsiya grab-ization) practically for nothing and the billions of hryvni from this will go toward repaying the stolen savings of citizens.¡±

The continuing attacks by Yushchenko and Baloha on Tymoshenko have also had four important ramifications.

First, they have continued to demonstrate that Yushchenko does not comply with the rule of law. This was exemplified by his legally questionable April 2, 2007, decree disbanding parliament. A wide variety of commentaries have pointed to the lack of constitutionality for the majority of the president¡¯s interferences in the work of Tymoshenko¡¯s government. The president, let alone a state bureaucrat who heads his secretariat, has no legal right, for example, to intervene in economic affairs and privatization. BYuT Deputy Mykola Tomenko wondered on what grounds the secretariat ¡°teaches the Ukrainian people and government how to work.¡±

Second, the attacks and rivalry have eroded the president¡¯s support to such an extent that nearly all commentators agree that Yushchenko cannot be elected to a second term. His ferociously anti-Tymoshenko stance immediately following her confirmation as prime minister on December 18 of last year lost Yushchenko the opportunity to align himself with her electoral prowess and popularity to win a second term as an Orange president while she would remain prime minister.

Third, the attacks have pushed Tymoshenko and BYuT beyond tolerating interference and unrelenting criticism on a greater scale than from even the opposition¡¯s shadow cabinet.

The situation came to a head in mid April in a week that witnessed an anti-Tymoshenko pamphlet distributed at a meeting between the president and governors, Tymoshenko¡¯s speech to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Yushchenko¡¯s two-hour diatribe against alleged corruption in the Tymoshenko government, threats by the presidential secretariat to launch criminal proceedings against the government and a harsh BYuT parliamentary response.

The outcome was again not to the president¡¯s advantage. Ukraine¡¯s most pro-presidential political force, the BYuT, which was the only faction to vote against constitutional reforms on December 8, 2004, is today in the vanguard in drawing up a parliamentary constitution that severely reduces presidential powers. The Party of Regions, which feared a Tymoshenko victory under the 2006 constitution, cannot believe what luck it now has in finding in the BYuT an unlikely ally in parliament. Yushchenko¡¯s Constitutional Council, which he hoped would bring in constitutional reforms that would give him back powers, is for all purposes dead in the water.

Finally, Yushchenko¡¯s unwillingness to abide by the 2006 constitution that he himself negotiated in December 2004 has led to two near-violent incidents. In May 2007 and April 2008 the president illegally ordered the presidential guard to take control of the offices of the prosecutor-general and the State Property Fund. Government buildings are supposed to be protected by Interior Ministry¡¯s Special Forces, not the presidential guard.

The two months leading to the summer recess are likely to determine Yushchenko¡¯s fate. If a new constitutional process is set in motion in parliament, next year will see pre-term parliamentary and presidential elections, in which Yushchenko is likely to be eclipsed from Ukrainian politics. (Ukrayinska Pravda, April 24-May 7, www.president.gov.ua May 5, byut.com.ua, April 14, Viktor Yushchenko, Viriu v Ukrayinu, 2004)
               

--Taras Kuzio

 

Eurasia Daily Monitor  

May 14, 2008          
MOSCOW QUESTIONS TERRITORIAL STATUS QUO IN THE CRIMEA
                    
Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and senior members of Russia¡¯s Duma persist in making territorial claims to Sevastopol, following Luzhkov¡¯s foray into the Ukrainian territory of the Crimea (see EDM, May 13). These continuing statements appear designed to question Ukraine¡¯s sovereignty in Sevastopol, and more broadly in the Crimea, at the Russian-Ukrainian level and even internationally.

Russia¡¯s executive branch of government is itself moving, albeit less demonstratively than the politicians, from unqualified recognition of Ukraine¡¯s territorial integrity to a qualified recognition, contingent on Ukraine¡¯s decisions with regard to Russia¡¯s naval base in Sevastopol and Ukraine-NATO relations. Russia is building leverage to pressure Ukraine on those issues by questioning the territorial status quo.

On his return to Moscow, Luzhkov escalated the demands for territorial revision in a televised interview and a communiqu¨¦ from his office. ¡°Ukraine thinks that the Crimea belongs to Ukraine and that Sevastopol also does. I say that this state has no grounds whatsoever for appropriating the Crimea and Sevastopol.¡± At a minimum, ¡°it is our obligation to confirm the Russian status and the Russian ownership of Sevastopol.¡± Furthermore, Russia must act before the expiry of the Russian Fleet¡¯s lease of the Sevastopol base [it expires in 2017, but the evacuation would have to start much earlier]. Along with ¡°our special attitude to our history, our special memories,¡± he argues, ¡°Russia can not provide security for our southern borders without Sevastopol. The consequences of losing it are unimaginable.¡± (Interfax, Center TV, May 13).

According to the Duma¡¯s vice-chairman from the One Russia governing party, Lyubov Sliska, ¡°Luzhkov¡¯s statements correspond to reality. We shall have to resolve the Crimea problem in any case.¡± Sliska and other Duma members support the proposal to launch legal action in international courts for the return of Sevastopol, and potentially the Crimea, to Russia (Interfax, Itar-Tass, May 12, 13).

Russian politicians often cite Sevastopol¡¯s status bestowed in 1948 as an administrative entity distinct from the rest of the Crimea and subordinated (as was the rest of the Crimea for a period of time) directly to the central authorities in Moscow. According to this argument, Sevastopol¡¯s status of direct subordination to Moscow did not change when the USSR government transferred the Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954. Russian revisionist politicians now regard that transfer as an illegitimate ¡°personal¡± decision by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, although the decision was in fact made collectively by the USSR bodies of power in accordance with the Soviet law of the time.

The revisionist arguments also ignore the legal situation that has existed since 1991, with international recognition of Ukraine¡¯s sovereignty in the Crimea and Sevastopol (with no distinction made between them). In addition, Russia itself recognized Ukraine¡¯s sovereignty over the area in the 1997 interstate treaty, 1997 agreement on the basing of the fleet and the 2004 Russia-Ukraine treaty on the mutual borders.

The Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry¡¯s May 12 statement defending Luzhkov omitted the customary acknowledgement of Ukraine¡¯s territorial integrity. Such acknowledgements have been a matter of routine in official statements even with regard to countries where Russia violates that integrity de facto, such as Georgia and Moldova. Meanwhile, Russia has openly withdrawn its recognition of Georgia¡¯s territorial integrity and is moving toward a conditional form of recognition of Ukraine¡¯s integrity. Its omission from the Russian MFA¡¯s statement, along with its support for Luzhkov, reflects this incipient process.

Vladimir Putin¡¯s recent remarks while still president of Russia clarified Russia¡¯s position on that account. During the recent NATO summit and in the follow-up meeting with U.S. President George W. Bush in Sochi, Putin commented that much of Ukraine¡¯s territory had been ¡°given away¡± by Russia and that Ukraine would ¡°cease to exist as a state¡± if it joined NATO. In that case, Putin hinted, Russia would encourage secession of the Crimea and eastern regions of Ukraine. While Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov refused to deny Putin¡¯s comments, Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov confirmed them almost explicitly, though more diplomatically, for the media. Duma politicians and Kremlin consultants, such as Gleb Pavlovsky, have suggested that Russia withdraw from the 1997 treaty or, technically speaking, not renew its validity upon its expiry in 2009 (see EDM, March 24, April 10, 14).

Non-renewal of the treaty, or suspension pending renegotiation, would also reflect Russia¡¯s move toward conditional recognition of territorial integrity in the case of Ukraine and potentially with other countries also.

Moscow seems interested in generating some kind of bilateral or international debate about the status of the Crimea and Sevastopol. It may also want to increase its influence on the peninsula by sending encouraging signals to local activist groups. The Ukrainian government is reacting calmly, aware that polemical reactions could play into Moscow¡¯s hands.
                   

--Vladimir Socor

 

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Commentary: Russia Versus NATO In The CIS 

By Stephen Blank



 

NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (left) meets with then-Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow in 2007 (file photo)

(epa)

After the April NATO-Russia summit in Bucharest, Russia's government promised to fight NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine in every possible way. Yet the issue at hand was not membership, but rather issuing Kyiv and Tbilisi Membership Action Plans (MAPs) whose implementation NATO would review before deciding about membership.



Russia's storm of threats and attacks against Ukraine, Georgia, and NATO prompted Germany to block the granting of these MAPs. But Moscow's hysteria (no other word fits) led NATO to declare that Ukraine and Georgia will be members and gave the meeting of foreign ministers scheduled for December the power to decide about the MAPs.

At the NATO-Russia Council, then-Russian President Vladimir Putin told U.S. President George W. Bush: "But George, don't you understand that Ukraine is not a state." Putin further claimed that most of its territory was a Russian gift in the 1950s. Moreover, Putin said, while western Ukraine belongs to Eastern Europe, eastern Ukraine is "ours." Then he said that if Ukraine does enter NATO, Russia would detach eastern Ukraine (and the Crimean Peninsula) and graft them onto Russia. Thus Ukraine would cease to exist as a state.

Putin also said Russia regards NATO's eastward enlargement as a threat. Therefore, if Georgia receives membership, Moscow will "take adequate measures" and recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia to create a buffer between NATO and Russia. Putin has subsequently lifted earlier sanctions on these provinces and has given them consular status -- a formal legal status preparatory to declaring their independence -- and humanitarian assistance, possibly preparatory to incorporating them.

As Russia reinforces its forces in these provinces, its spokesmen charge that Georgia is planning a war and that Russia will use force to defend "its citizens." Thus Moscow's forces recently downed a Georgian drone over Abkhazia. Clearly Moscow is conducting what Tbilisi calls a creeping annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 

Abuse And Intimidation

Putin's outburst and subsequent policies reflect Russia's abiding belief that neither Ukraine, nor Georgia, nor any other post-Soviet state, is truly sovereign. Therefore they are all fit targets for systematic Russian abuse and intimidation that aims to undo the settlement of 1989-91. Moscow's ambassadors and foreign policy professionals routinely offer abundant evidence of Moscow's belief in these states' diminished sovereignty, saying as much in Tallinn, Riga, Kyiv, Baku, Tbilisi, Bishkek, Moldova, Sofia, and Budapest or in interviews in Moscow. Although Moscow regards NATO enlargement as a major threat, Russia's policies starkly reveal why enlargement is necessary for European security.

Moscow still thinks it can or should be able to boss these states around or use them as a Trojan horse to enter Europe and undermine its institutions. Russia's ambassador to the EU, Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Chizhov, once declared that, "Bulgaria is in a good position to become our special partner, a kind of Trojan horse in the EU." Today, many analysts and diplomats argue that Germany plays such a role in the EU and NATO. Past performance also suggests that Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's new government might follow suit. Meanwhile, as one Ukrainian official told me in 2006, Russia is waging a Cold War.

None of it is surprising. Russian spokesmen regularly argue that Russia counts for more than these small states, that its interests trump their interests, and that their sovereignty and independence are shams. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's February 2007 statement that Russia will not permit Georgia to join NATO was an assertion that he does not regard Georgia as a fully independent or sovereign state.

'Some Sort Of Province'

Sergei Markov, director of the Moscow Institute of Political Studies, told a Georgian interviewer in 2006 that "Georgia has not yet earned our respect for its sovereignty because it has proven unable to achieve an agreement with the Abkhazian and South Ossetian ethnic minorities." Similarly, Russian Ambassador to Georgia Vyacheslav Kovalenko said that "Russia wants Georgia to be independent, sovereign, and neutral." Since Georgia's political class unanimously wants entry to NATO and the EU, Kovalenko is demanding that Georgia renounce its independence and democracy and leave itself vulnerable to Russia. Russian diplomats at an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe meeting in 2005 referred to Georgia as "some sort of province."

With that derogation of former republics' sovereignty goes the formulation and implementation of policies designed to undermine it in fact. Self-determination then becomes a principle to destroy sovereignty. For example, on August 6, 2007, a Russian aircraft dropped a large surface-to-air missile that failed to detonate near an upgraded Georgian radar station at Tsitelubani. A Western assessment of this incident based on international investigations concluded that this incursion into Georgian air space was directed against both Georgia and NATO (to probe NATO's response). The authors noted that this event echoed similar Russian air-space incursions into the Baltic states just before they joined NATO and represented a similar effort to intimidate the target countries.

"While a Russian air attack is no doubt more likely than an assault by land," the assessment concludes, "Georgia must be prepared for more, greater, and different forms of intimidation. These include, but are not limited to, Special Forces actions in the conflict zones, environmental attacks, quest for economic control of strategic assets, or cyber warfare."

Cyprus Solution

Arguably the resemblance between what Estonia and the Baltic states have experienced and this list of potential threats is not accidental. After all, on November 12, 2007, Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili announced that at the CIS summit in Minsk in 2006 Putin had threatened to impose a "Cyprus model" on Georgia by recognizing the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. While Lavrov categorically denied this and it is not clear why Saakashvili was silent for a year, a "Cyprus solution" fits the pattern of recent Russian policies.

While Putin's latest moves fell short of recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia; they signaled that Moscow has repudiated these territories' status as being under Georgian sovereignty (though that was breached when Moscow gave residents there Russian passports) and does not expect them to return to Georgia. 

"This creates a situation where Abkhazia¡¯s and South Ossetia¡¯s further evolution would rely solely on their ties with Russia, drawing them into the Russian economic and legal space which would make reunification with Georgia an untenable proposition," Russian analyst Vladimir Frolov has said. "Moscow is signaling to Abkhazia and South Ossetia that their independence, or incorporation into Russia, is all but inevitable in the future, while today Russia is prepared to treat them like it does Taiwan -- everything but a formal recognition of independence."

Thus Russia says that if Georgia joins NATO, its territories will be truncated, but if it remains "neutral" -- i.e. sacrifices its sovereignty and democracy -- it might regain its provinces. Alternatively, Moscow seeks to provoke Tbilisi into actions that would then furnish a pretext for discrediting it as a potential NATO member. Such neo-imperial policies violate the 1975 Helsinki Accords, the cornerstone of European security, as well as Russo-Georgian agreements on peacekeeping in those provinces. But they represent long-standing Russian approaches.

In late 2006, Putin offered Ukraine unsolicited security guarantees in return for an agreement to permanently base Russia's Black Sea Fleet on its territory, a superfluous but ominous gesture since Russia had already guaranteed Ukraine's security through the 1992 Tashkent Treaty and the 1994 Tripartite Agreement with Ukraine and the United States to denuclearize Ukraine. Putin's offer also coincided with his typically "dialectical" approach to Ukraine' sovereignty in Crimea.

"Crimea forms part of the Ukrainian side and we cannot interfere in another country's internal affairs," Putin said in the fall of 2006. "At the same time, however, Russia cannot be indifferent to what happens in Ukraine and Crimea."

Uprising In Crimea

Putin thus hinted that Ukrainian resistance to Russian limits on its freedom of action might be met with a Russian backed "Kosovo-like" scenario -- a nationalist uprising in Crimea to which Russia could not remain indifferent. Obviously, Moscow has the political and covert means to create in Crimea the very type of situations against which Putin offered to "protect" Ukraine if the Russian fleet's basing rights are institutionalized. Such means have included inflammatory visits and speeches by Russian Duma deputies to Crimea, challenges to Ukraine's control of Tuzla Island in the Kerch Strait, and the fanning of "anti-NATO" -- in fact anti-American -- protests by ethnic-Russian groups in connection with military exercises and artificial Russian-Tatar tensions on the peninsula.

Russia is also augmenting its capabilities for such covert subversion by instituting a substantial program whereby it gives soldiers and officers in the Transdniester "army," which occupies part of Moldova, Russian military-service passports and rotating them through elite Russian officer training courses called Vystrel at the combined-arms training center in Solnechegorsk.

"You do not try to cover up a training program of this size unless you are someday planning on using these people to overthrow or otherwise take control of a sovereign government," an intelligence officer from a post-Soviet country recently told U.S. analyst Reuben Johnson in 2006. "The facility at Solnechegorsk is used by Russia to train numerous non-Russian military personnel openly and legally for peacekeeping and other joint operations. If then, in parallel, you are training officers from these disputed regions -- officers that are pretending to be Russian personnel and carrying bogus paperwork -- then it does not take an enormous leap of faith to assume that Moscow is up to no good on this one."

Campaigning against Ukraine's drive toward NATO, Russia has threatened to target it with missiles, shut down defense-industry cooperation, revised its relationship with Kyiv, instituted economic boycotts, and, of course, taken punitive measures against Ukrainian energy supplies. Similarly, Moscow has launched overflights and bombing raids, instituted repeated energy cutoffs and trade sanctions, given Abkhazia and South Ossetia residents Russian passports, launched blockades against Georgia, deported Georgians from Russia, and dropped bombs on Georgian villages.

No New Russian Empire

Clearly Moscow will intensify the pressure upon these states to provoke them to undertake rash policies, using every instrument at its disposal -- from exploiting their energy dependence to restricting their freedom of action in defense and foreign policies. In 2007-08, Moscow has sought to intimidate the Baltic states, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia to subordinate their foreign policies to Moscow's dictates. Central Asian countries have been pressured to sell their gas to Russia rather than directly to Western markets. Similar tactics have been seen in Eastern Europe as well. 

Is not defense against such threats the purpose for which NATO was created? Neither the United States nor Europe can stand aloof and let Moscow restore the Russian empire and again threaten European security. Russian empire and European security are contradictions in terms. If the West wants to integrate a democratic Russia, restore Russia's European vocation, and ensure Russia's real security and stability, it must preclude the restoration of a new Russian empire.

The restoration of autocracy and empire necessarily entails insecurity and instability for great swathes of Europe and Asia. Ultimately, as analysts John Roper and Peter Van Ham have written, "The main reason why the West cannot remain complacent about Russia's actions is the fact that Russia's 'near abroad' is, in many cases, also democratic Europe's near abroad."

Stephen Blank is a professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. The views expressed here do not in any way represent those of the U.S. Army, the Defense Department, or the U.S. government.

Charter ¡¯97, Minsk

Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act mentions economic sanctions against Lukashenka¡¯s regime  

 

Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act of 2008 includes economic sanctions against Lukashenka¡¯s regime. On May 6 a bill extending Belarus Democracy Act for two years was introduced for consideration by the US Congress. Orest Deychakiwsky, the U.S. Helsinki Commission (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe) senior staff advisor, comments on that for Voice of America.

Congressmen Christopher Smith, Alcee Hastings, Thaddeus McCotter, Lincoln Diaz-Balart, John Shimkus, James McGovern, Frank Pallone, Mike McIntyre, Rush Holt, Danny Davis and a number of other Congressmen introduced the bill HR 5970 IH.

- Mr. Deychakiwsky, can the Belarus Democracy Reauthorization Act of 2008 be viewed as a kind of response of the US to the recent aggravation of diplomatic relations between Minsk and Washington?

- The introduced bill is an amended variant of the first Belarus Democracy Act. It is to be reauthorized every two years, as its financing for such a period is envisaged. The two year period was expiring this year, so we needed to introduce it. This means that there is no connection between the bill¡¯s introduction and the recent diplomatic row.

However, in this context it is necessary to note the following. If the situation in Belarus had changed for the better over the last two years, there would be no need for a new reauthorization of the Act. In other words, if human rights violations diminished in Belarus, the situation with democracy improved, if Lukashenka¡¯s regime stopped repressions against civil society, Congress would not have to consider this issue.

But in reality we have the following: only over the last two months we see verdicts of Belarusian authorities to activists of the youth movement for participation in peaceful demonstrations, fines to human rights activists for the collection of signatures against the repressive Law on Religion of 2002. Alyaksandr Kazulin is still in prison, and even two more political prisoners have emerged (Andrei Kim and Syarhei Parsyukevich). A citizen of the US Emanuil Zeltser is kept in Belarusian prison. We asked to release him out of humanitarian reasons, as his state of health has declined. A cyber-attack was organized against web mass-media supported buy the US Congress, and so on.

Unfortunately we see no progress in the situation with democracy and human rights in Belarus under the current regime.

- The Belarus Democracy Reauthorization which has been recently introduced in the Congress is the third bill already. Are there any differences from the previous ones?

- The main provisions remain the same as in the Act of 2006: it supports human rights activists, independent mass media and trade unions, youth movements, democratic political parties. Support of independent radio and TV broadcasting to Belarus is included; and certainly economic and visa sanctions against members of the Belarusian leadership are included as well.

The most visible changes have taken place in the premises part of the bill. It contains information about the events in Belarus, support to actions of the US Department of State and US Treasury in the realization of the Act in force is expressed, namely steps taken against Belneftekhim concern.

However, the bill also contains a statement by which we want to send a signal to Lukashenka¡¯s regime: the US remains ready to reconsider its policy towards Belarus if the authorities of the country take real steps towards progress on democracy and human rights, in other words, we are leaving the door open.

It is worth mentioning another detail. With regard to external broadcasting into Belarus we specifically mentioned Radio Svaboda, Voice of America, European Radio for Belarus and Belsat. We believe that breaking the informational blockade imposed by the Belarusian regime is very important.

 

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